Last updated: · 13 min read
In brief
Investors were about 50 percent more likely to sell a stock that had risen than one that had fallen, and the habit cost them. The bias behind it, loss aversion, helped win a Nobel Prize and became a dinner-table idea. The fame barely changed how people traded. Pooled across some 200 studies, financial education explained just 0.1 percent of the variance in behaviour. What works is redesigning the decision: automatic enrolment lifted retirement-plan participation among new hires by about fifty percentage points. No default yet guards the moment an investor stares at a losing stock.
Contents
In 1998, the financial economist Terrance Odean published a study of 10,000 individual brokerage accounts spanning seven years of trading. The finding was specific and, once you absorbed it, disturbing. A stock that had gone up was about 50 percent more likely to be sold than one that had gone down. As a group, the investors were selling their winners and clinging to their losers, a habit that measurably cost them in after-tax returns. They did it systematically, across thousands of accounts and over years.
The study was not obscure. Two decades earlier, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky had described the trait behind it, loss aversion, in a paper about choices between gambles that would eventually help earn Kahneman a Nobel Prize. By the time Odean found the pattern in real brokerage accounts, the framework was already becoming famous. Kahneman won the Nobel in Economics in 2002. His book Thinking, Fast and Slow went on to sell millions of copies. In 2017 Richard Thaler won his own Nobel for work on the same territory. Loss aversion, the disposition effect and cognitive bias became dinner-table concepts for the educated public.
All that fame barely made a dent in how people traded. The aggregate pattern Odean documented persisted: two decades later, nearly 400,000 traders in 83 countries were still selling winners and holding losers. Even telling people about the bias directly buys only a reprieve. Participants taught about the disposition effect showed less of it straight away and two weeks later, but by three months the effect of the lesson was no longer statistically detectable.
That gap, between how widely the bias is known and how little the knowing changes it, says something about what kind of problem financial failure is, and why most of what we do about it is aimed at the wrong level.
The mechanism
The reason knowledge helps so little starts with the mechanism. Loss aversion, as Kahneman and Tversky defined it in prospect theory, is an asymmetry in how people value outcomes relative to a reference point: the value function is steeper for losses than for gains. Later estimates put the ratio at roughly two. A loss of $100 hurts about twice as much as a gain of $100 pleases, and people weigh the two experiences differently instead of treating them as one event running in opposite directions.
Offer someone a coin flip: heads, you win $150; tails, you lose $100. The bet has a positive expected value, and over a hundred flips it would very likely leave you ahead. Most people refuse it anyway. They can do the arithmetic, but they weigh the potential loss of $100 as if it were a gain of about $200, and against that the $150 upside looks too small.
Hersh Shefrin and Meir Statman gave this pattern a name in 1985: the disposition effect. In investment decisions, selling a winning position feels good, because it locks in a gain, and gains are pleasant. Holding a losing position avoids the alternative, which is selling at a loss, and losses hurt more than equal gains please. So investors sell their winners too early and hold their losers too long: selling a loser would mean experiencing a loss, and the asymmetry pushes people to avoid that experience even when holding on costs money.
Odean’s accounts showed the pattern at scale, though he noted that a mistaken belief that losers would bounce back could produce the same trades. The more troubling evidence comes from professionals. Proprietary traders on the Chicago Board of Trade turned out to be highly loss-averse too: after losing money in the morning, they routinely took above-average risk in the afternoon to win it back. And at a major Israeli brokerage, professionally managed accounts showed the disposition effect as well as self-directed ones, only in a milder form. Professional management, or the kind of investor who opts for it, attenuated the pattern without eliminating it. If expertise could override the bias, it should have vanished among professionals under market discipline; it only weakened.
The disposition effect survives reading about it because, on the leading account, it sits in how people weigh gains and losses, and that determines what kind of intervention could work. Education fixes ignorance. Against a bias of this kind it can only nibble at the edges.
A note on the replication crisis
Are the findings in this article casualties of the replication crisis that has battered behavioural science, social psychology above all, since the early 2010s? A number of the social priming effects cited in Kahneman's own popular book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, have failed to replicate. Kahneman warned priming researchers of a looming "train wreck" in a 2012 open letter, and in 2017 he publicly conceded that he had placed too much faith in underpowered studies. But loss aversion, prospect theory and the disposition effect are not priming effects. They come from a different empirical tradition, grounded in market data such as Odean's brokerage records, controlled economic experiments such as the endowment studies by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, and housing-market records such as Genesove and Mayer's condominium data. These findings have been replicated across countries, asset classes and investor populations in the decades since. How large loss aversion is remains argued over: estimates cluster around two but vary with the task and the stakes, and experiments that controlled for participants' misunderstandings of the procedure have made the endowment gap disappear. The direction of the patterns has held up better than any single number.
The time problem
A second bias, hyperbolic discounting, governs a different category of financial decision, and it describes something odder than impatience. That people prefer immediate rewards has been common sense for millennia; the strange part is the inconsistency. Give someone two options: $900 in 30 days, or $1,000 in 31 days. Most people pick the $1,000, since one more day is a small price for an extra hundred. Now move both options forward so they start today: $900 right now, or $1,000 tomorrow. The person, the amounts and the one-day gap are all the same, and many people flip. They take the $900 now.
Richard Thaler documented this inconsistency in choices about money in the early 1980s, and David Laibson later made it a workhorse of economics with the quasi-hyperbolic discount function, a formula first sketched by Edmund Phelps and Robert Pollak in 1968, in which the step from now to any later date is discounted far more heavily than any step between two future dates. The present is special: people apply a different rule to now than to later.
Saving is the casualty. It is a transaction between your present self and your future self: you give up money now so that the person you will become has more of it later. Present bias systematically undervalues that future person. The discount is steep and automatic, so the decision to save often feels, at the moment of decision, like a bad trade: the present self is being asked to sacrifice for someone it is wired to undervalue.
When Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi designed the Save More Tomorrow (SMarT) programme, first tested at a US manufacturer and published in 2004, they did not try to teach workers about hyperbolic discounting and hope for the best. They restructured the decision. Workers committed in advance to putting part of their future pay rises into retirement savings: money they didn’t yet have, which belonged to the future self. The commitment was made before the money became present-self income. Participants’ savings rates rose from 3.5 percent to nearly 14 percent over four successive pay raises.
The ownership distortion
Loss aversion also distorts how people value anything they own. The endowment effect, a term Richard Thaler coined in 1980, is the observation that people demand significantly more to give up something they possess than they would pay to acquire the same thing. Kahneman, Thaler and Jack Knetsch later tested it by giving half the participants in an experiment a coffee mug and then opening a market. The median seller demanded $5.25; the median buyer offered between $2.25 and $2.75. Owners wanted about twice what buyers would pay for the same mug, an ordinary one they had been handed minutes earlier.
The leading explanation is loss aversion applied to ownership. Once you own something, giving it up registers as a loss, while acquiring something you don’t own registers as a gain, and losses weigh more than gains. So the psychological cost of selling is systematically higher than the psychological benefit of buying, even when the object is identical and the person is the same.
The same overvaluation shows up in houses, where it costs far more. David Genesove and Christopher Mayer studied Boston’s downtown condominium market during the 1990s downturn. They found that owners facing nominal losses, whose property’s market value had fallen below their original purchase price, set asking prices higher than other sellers by 25 to 35 percent of that shortfall, the gap between the expected selling price and what they had paid. They recovered only a sliver of it: their final sale prices were higher by just 3 to 18 percent of the shortfall. And they paid for it with a much lower rate of sale. Their units lingered on the market while others sold.
Across a whole market, those choices add up. When prices fall, owners facing a loss hold their asking prices above what buyers will pay, anchored to what they paid. Sales slow and the market takes longer to clear, which helps explain why housing sales volumes tend to fall along with prices.
For these sellers the original purchase price feels more real than the current market price. You can explain the endowment effect to a homeowner sitting on a property worth $50,000 less than they paid for it. They will nod and understand the mechanism, and may even recognise it in their own behaviour, yet they will still set their asking price too high, because the mechanism that produces the behaviour does not operate at the level of understanding.
Mental accounting and the weight of reference points
A related phenomenon helps explain why the purchase price feels so heavy. Richard Thaler called it mental accounting: the tendency to treat money differently depending on where it came from or which mental category it occupies. A $5,000 tax refund gets spent differently from $5,000 of salary, even though the dollars are identical. Casino winnings, or "house money", get gambled more freely than earned savings. And the price you paid for an asset becomes the reference point against which all future prices are judged. It stays there even though it reflects no economic reality, because people file it in a category that carries psychological weight. That helps explain the Boston sellers. The purchase price anchors an entire mental account, and selling below it means closing that account at a loss, an act loss aversion makes painful.
The optimism trap
The planning fallacy pushes the other way. Kahneman and Tversky named it in 1979: the systematic tendency to underestimate the cost, duration and difficulty of projects we plan to undertake. In later experiments, participants consistently predicted task completion times more optimistically than their own prior experience with identical tasks would justify. They had done similar things before, they knew how long those things had taken, and they predicted faster anyway.
The mechanism is what Kahneman later called the inside view versus the outside view. When you plan a project, whether renovating a kitchen, launching a business or saving for retirement, you instinctively build the plan from the inside: you imagine the specific sequence of steps, assume they will proceed more or less as intended, and arrive at a time and cost estimate that reflects your plan rather than reality. The outside view, what actually happened to other people who tried the same thing, is available but feels less relevant than your own plan. So you ignore it.
More than a fifth of new US business establishments close within their first year, and about half are gone within five years. That is the outside view, and it is rarely the one a business plan starts from. Retirement shows the same gap. In 2026, just 12 percent of US workers said they plan to retire before age 60, but 29 percent of retirees said they had, and 46 percent of retirees left the workforce earlier than planned, most often because of a health problem or disability.
Kahneman and Dan Lovallo carried the mechanism into business, showing how it produces cost overruns and benefit shortfalls without any dishonesty in executives’ projections: the inside view is the default cognitive mode, and the outside view requires a deliberate, effortful override that rarely happens.
Loss aversion and the endowment effect are failures of excessive caution, driven by fear of loss and reluctance to let go of what you have. The planning fallacy is a failure of excessive optimism. Together they leave people too afraid of loss when looking at what they already hold and too confident when planning what comes next, and knowing it will not stop the estimate for your next home renovation coming in low, because the fallacy operates at the moment you believe you are making an accurate assessment.
The wrong cure
The institutional answer, for the better part of fifty years, has been financial education: teach people the maths, explain compound interest, run budgeting workshops, put personal finance into school curricula. The logic seems sound. People make bad financial decisions because they don’t know enough, so give them more knowledge.
Daniel Fernandes, John Lynch and Richard Netemeyer tested that logic by pooling some 200 studies of financial literacy and financial education. Interventions to improve financial literacy explained 0.1 percent of the variance in the financial behaviours studied.
Even that fraction decayed. Beyond twenty months, the effects of financial education on behaviour approached zero, and large interventions with many hours of instruction had negligible impact once enough time had passed. The relationship between financial education and financial behaviour is real, but at population scale it is vanishingly small.
Other researchers read the evidence more favourably. Pooling impact evaluations, Tim Kaiser and Lukas Menkhoff found that financial education does change behaviour, with an average effect of 0.09 standard deviations. Kaiser, Menkhoff and colleagues later pooled only randomised experiments and put the average effect, in comparable units, at least three times as large as Fernandes’s team had found in the trials available to it, and called the effects economically meaningful. But even on the most favourable reading, the average effect on behaviour is around a tenth of a standard deviation: a real signal, but a small one.
Even the more favourable evidence points back to the decision. Kaiser and Menkhoff found larger effects from more hours of instruction and from education delivered at what they call a “teachable moment”, teaching tied directly to a decision the learner is about to make. Education that people could apply straight away to a concrete decision was associated with larger effects on behaviour than education delivered in the abstract, though the link weakened when the analysis was limited to randomised trials. If it holds, what helps is proximity to the decision, and the moment of decision is exactly where the SMarT programme intervened.
So the evidence says financial education moves behaviour only at the margins. Yet a majority of US states have mandated financial literacy education, many of them with requirements still phasing in. The OECD runs an International Network on Financial Education with close to 300 public institutions from over 130 countries. Employers fund financial wellness programmes, and banks sponsor literacy curricula. The infrastructure is vast and expanding, and on the evidence it is a remarkably weak instrument for its stated purpose.
One plausible reason it persists is where it puts the problem: in individuals, in their knowledge deficits and their failure to understand compound interest. That location is convenient for everyone who is not the individual. It requires no changes to how financial products are designed, marketed or regulated. It brings institutional funding and visible activity, with completion rates that can be reported as progress, and it leaves the institutions that structure the choices people face under no obligation to redesign them.
An intervention whose best evidence shows effects this small (0.1 percent of the variance in the most-cited meta-analysis, about a tenth of a standard deviation in the most favourable) and which keeps expanding anyway is being sustained by something besides its results.
The clearest successes changed the decision itself. Thaler and Benartzi built a commitment into the pay-rise cycle. When a large US company switched its 401(k) plan from opt-in to automatic enrolment, without a single seminar, participation among new hires rose by approximately fifty percentage points.
That approach has since reached the law. US 401(k) and 403(b) plans established on or after 29 December 2022 must, from 2025, enrol eligible workers automatically and raise their contribution rate each year, with exceptions for the smallest and newest employers and for church and government plans. Plans that already existed are exempt.
Odean’s investors were ordinary people trading their own money, and the pattern that cost them was predictable in advance from a theory published in 1979.
In the nearly five decades since, that theory has helped win Nobel Prizes, filled books that sold millions of copies and become one of the most widely known ideas in social science, and investors still sell winners and hold losers. The new retirement rules reach the moment of enrolment. No default sits at the moment an investor looks at a losing stock and decides to wait for it to come back.
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Further reading
As an Amazon Associate, Eikleaf earns from qualifying purchases. The book links below are affiliate links: if you buy through them, we may earn a small commission at no extra cost to you.
The Psychology of Money: Timeless Lessons on Wealth, Greed, and HappinessShort stories explain how personal history, emotions, risk and expectations shape saving and investment decisions.
Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and HappinessExplains how defaults, automatic enrolment and commitment mechanisms change financial behaviour when information alone has limited effects.
The Behavioral Investor: How Psychology Shapes Wealth, Risk, and Investment DecisionsConnects investor biases with rules and portfolio design intended to reduce emotionally driven trading decisions.
Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral EconomicsThaler recounts how experiments and financial anomalies challenged rational-choice models and led to practical saving interventions.Recommended videos
10:33Behavioral Economics: Crash Course Economics #27Crash Course overview of the behavioural biases behind predictable money mistakes.
6:36Loss Aversion | Concepts UnwrappedUT Austin explainer on loss aversion, the bias at the centre of the article.
1:02:26Thinking, Fast and Slow | Daniel Kahneman | Talks at GoogleDaniel Kahneman himself on the two systems of thinking behind financial biases.Cite this article
Lena Martin. “The psychology of money: why smart people make predictable financial mistakes.” Eikleaf, 10 May 2026, updated 2 November 2026. https://www.eikleaf.com/the-psychology-of-money-why-smart-people-make-predictable-financial-mistakes/
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