Last updated: · 13 min read
In brief
In a Deira shopfront, a man takes cash, writes a number on a slip and makes a phone call. Within hours, someone in Mogadishu says a code and walks out with cash. No money crosses the border; a debt does. Regulators call hawala informal, yet Islamic jurists were discussing its contract by the eighth century, centuries before the Bank of England. Western banks chose not to serve places like Somalia, then cut ties with the firms that did. That retreat, meant to increase transparency, pushed money toward channels that are harder to see.
Contents
Any of the remittance shopfronts in Deira looks like a dozen others on the same street: a glass counter, stacked paperwork, a ceiling fan doing approximately nothing, a phone that hasn’t stopped since morning. The man behind the counter takes cash, writes a number on a slip of paper, speaks a few words in Somali or Urdu or Pashto, then makes a call. He issues no receipt, no transfer confirmation and no transaction ID. In a few hours, sometimes less, someone in Mogadishu or Peshawar will walk into an equivalent shopfront, say a code, and walk out with cash.
No wire transfer moves through a correspondent bank, and no SWIFT message threads through a chain of intermediaries. Nothing crosses a border except a phone call and an obligation.
This is hawala. Nobody knows exactly how much money it moves. The data is poor, but the deeper problem is that the system cannot be measured from outside: it leaves no central ledger because it was never designed around one. The IMF has said that estimating the size of hawala transactions “cannot be undertaken with any reliability.”
Western governments, financial regulators, and the journalists who cover them have spent more than two decades treating hawala primarily as a money-laundering or terrorism-financing vehicle, something to be registered and monitored, and eventually replaced by the formal banking system as development catches up with the Global South. The assumption is temporal: hawala persists because proper banking hasn’t arrived yet.
But hawala’s roots go back well over a thousand years. The Bank of England was founded in 1694. Of the two, the man behind the counter in Deira works in the older tradition.
The Machine
A sender in Dubai (call him Ahmed) has a cousin in Karachi who needs $500. Ahmed walks into a Deira shopfront, hands over the equivalent in dirhams, and receives a code. The hawaladar, or broker, calls his counterpart in Karachi, another broker in a network built on years of relationship, and relays the code and the amount. Ahmed’s cousin walks to the Karachi broker, states the code, and receives the equivalent in Pakistani rupees. The transaction is complete.
No money crossed a border; a debt did. The Karachi broker has paid out money he hasn’t yet received, so he holds a claim on the Dubai broker, who took in Ahmed’s cash and now owes the offsetting debt.
At some point the two hawaladars settle. They might settle by reversing the flow: when money regularly moves both directions between two cities, the debts cancel. They might settle in gold. They might settle through trade goods: the Karachi broker imports fabric from the Dubai broker’s cousin, and the paper obligation dissolves into a shipment. In high-volume corridors the debts net down over weeks or months; settlement might happen once a quarter. This non-bank net settlement is the feature that distinguishes the whole system: brokers run obligations against each other and settle in whatever form is most efficient.
That efficiency rests on a trust infrastructure with teeth: hawala networks are organized along kinship, clan, and village lines.
Entry into the network requires existing relationships, vouching, reputation accumulated over time. Becoming a hawaladar is a matter of being known rather than of registering a business and acquiring a license. A broker who defaults, by absconding with funds or failing to honor a settlement obligation, is excommunicated from the network. In contexts where the formal court system is absent, slow, or corrupt, that threat is close to absolute enforcement. The social cost of fraud, in a world where professional and personal identity are bound up with community standing, dwarfs whatever financial gain a single bad act might produce, which makes fraud structurally self-defeating. Fraud rates have never been measured systematically, because the system produces too little data, but the structural argument doesn’t depend on them.
The Other Side of Trust
Structural trust does not make the system clean. The same mechanism that makes fraud among legitimate users essentially irrational makes hawala attractive to people whose standing is real within a criminal network rather than a village or clan, and for whom the formal financial system is hostile.
UNODC interviewed 113 hawaladars across 18 countries. Most did not ask where money came from or what it was for, and more than half said that even when they had doubts about the source of funds, they had never refused a transaction. In Afghanistan, hawaladars carry payments to opium poppy farmers and move trafficking proceeds across borders, in an opiate economy that UNODC valued at $1.8–2.7 billion in 2021 alone.
Edwina Thompson argued that the post-9/11 literature collapsed a diverse financial ecosystem into a single threat narrative, and that evidence specifically linking hawala to terrorism financing was considerably thinner than the policy response assumed.
Hawala networks serve the drug trade in southern Afghanistan, and the formal financial system's own extensive record of criminal facilitation does not change that.
The Original
By the eighth century CE, Islamic jurists were discussing a debt-transfer contract called hawala, and the remittance system that carries the name was developing in South and South-East Asia in the same century. The Abbasid Caliphate, which ruled from 750 to 1258 CE and stretched from North Africa to Central Asia, used suftaja, precursor instruments that functioned on the same debt-transfer logic, to facilitate trade across what was then the most sophisticated commercial network on earth. A merchant in Baghdad could transfer value to a counterpart in Samarkand without touching a coin. By the time Europe’s first public banks opened, the system was already centuries old.
The South Asian strand is older still. The hundi, a bill of exchange instrument used throughout the Indian subcontinent, traces its precursors to the adesha, a written order instructing a banker to pay a third party, which was in use in India’s Mauryan period, roughly 321 to 185 BCE. Whether the modern system descends from the Islamic contract, the South Asian instruments, or the Tang-dynasty Chinese remittance networks is disputed, and a close comparison with the Islamic legal texts finds no exact counterpart there at all. No serious scholar argues that it is modern.
The Bank of England opened in 1694, and the Bank of Amsterdam, which some historians count as the first true central bank, in 1609. Hawala had been running for the better part of a thousand years by then.
The linguistic trace runs deep. Islamic merchants were writing payment orders called sakk, a technical term of early Islamic finance, centuries before Europe’s banks existed. The echo of the English “cheque” is tempting, but the popular claim that sakk gave English the word is not supported by standard dictionaries, which trace “cheque” to “check,” in the sense of a guard against forgery.
When Western financial regulators call hawala informal, they mean that they did not register it; the word says nothing about its organizational sophistication, its age, or its geographic reach.
The Linguistic Trail
Suftaja as a precursor to the European bill of exchange is debated but taken seriously by economic historians, whose work on the Cairo Geniza documents Islamic commercial instruments predating their European counterparts by centuries.
Islamic and European bills later diverged, and the divergence turned on impersonal exchange (anonymous market transactions with strangers), which European states' willingness to legalize interest helped develop and which Islamic finance, constrained by consistent interest prohibitions, did not. That says nothing about which path was more sophisticated at the origin. The Medici letters of credit, often cited as the foundation of modern European banking, operated in a world that had already absorbed Islamic financial concepts through trade contact.
The West adapted the original, built new institutional architecture around it, then called the original "informal."
The Numbers
A thousand years of refinement went into one task: moving value from one person to another, quickly and cheaply, across borders that formal banking treats as obstacles.
Hawala commissions typically run from about 0.5 to 7 percent of the transfer value, depending on destination, amount, and currency, and regular customers get discounts. Across hundreds of corridors, sending $200 cost an average of 6.36 percent in the third quarter of 2025.
Banks remain the most expensive type of provider, at roughly 15 percent. The UN wrote a target of 3 percent by 2030 into its Sustainable Development Goals, and the G20 endorsed it. Progress has stalled: the average fell from 9.3 percent in 2011 to about 6.3 percent in 2021 and has barely moved since, which makes the 2030 target unlikely. At the low end of its range, hawala already beats it.
Hawala transfers in high-volume corridors complete within hours. A wire transfer through correspondent banking can still take several business days, slow enough that the G20 has set a goal of crediting most cross-border payments within an hour by the end of 2027. That gap matters most when the recipient needs money to buy food today, not on Thursday.
But the fee and speed comparisons assume the formal alternative exists, and for hundreds of millions of people it doesn’t.
Somalia has no U.S. bank operating within its borders, and its own banks have struggled to win correspondent relationships with major international banks: some reach the dollar system through the Central Bank of Somalia, others through regional banks in neighboring countries that hold U.S. correspondent accounts. A Somali wishing to receive a wire transfer needs a bank account, in a country where the banking sector’s total assets amount to approximately 4.3 percent of GDP.
Mobile money has changed daily transactions in Somalia, where penetration is estimated at 73 percent, but hawala is still the most common way remittances reach Somali households: in 2023, 55 percent of households receiving remittances, whether from within Somalia or abroad, got them through hawala and 42 percent through mobile money. The formal correspondent banking links that connect Somalia to the global dollar system are thin and mostly indirect.
Somalis abroad send home an estimated $2 billion a year, about a sixth of the country’s entire GDP in 2024. For most of the people who need that money, the choice is between hawala and a service that doesn’t exist.
India received about $151 billion in remittances in 2025, by far the largest inflow of any country. Pakistan took in a record $41.6 billion in the fiscal year to June 2026.
These are the formal flows. Informal flows, called hundi in both corridors, persist alongside them because for many users hawala is the better product: same-day settlement, and fees that don’t swallow a week’s income. In much of this market, the formal system has barely shown up to compete.
The Withdrawal
Banks chose not to build cost-effective remittance corridors to Somalia or rural Pakistan or Caribbean island states.
The arithmetic was simple, if you were a compliance officer at a major Western bank in the 2010s: modest transaction fees plus outsized anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism-financing exposure, in corridors serving populations that lacked political representation in any jurisdiction that mattered. The relationships were not worth keeping.
This is called de-risking. The standard justification is that it was a rational response to the regulatory architecture created after 9/11: the USA PATRIOT Act and the FATF Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, both from 2001, the latter revised in 2012. FATF Recommendation 13 requires correspondent banks to scrutinize the anti-money-laundering controls of the banks they serve abroad, and many large banks came to fear they were also expected to vet those banks’ own customers, a worry that became known as “Know Your Customer’s Customer.” If Bank A in New York maintains a relationship with Bank B in Mogadishu, Bank A now carries risk for Bank B’s compliance framework, and possibly for Bank B’s clients. In countries where banking infrastructure barely exists, that exposure is unquantifiable. So Bank A terminates the relationship. Banks repeated that decision again and again across the Caribbean, the Pacific Islands, sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of Asia.
By 2016 the IMF was tracking the retreat across Caribbean banking sectors, Pacific island economies and sub-Saharan African corridors. The World Bank warned that de-risking may “threaten progress” on financial inclusion, and that pushing transactions out of the regulated system drives them into “more opaque, informal channels” that become “harder to monitor.” A policy designed to increase transparency pushed money toward channels that are harder to see, and the cost fell hardest on populations with no representation in the decision.
In Somalia’s case, a dispute with Barclays made the logic concrete.
Dahabshiil Transfer Services is one of the largest money transfer companies serving Africa, and Somalia in particular, and today operates in more than 100 countries. It banked with Barclays in the UK. In May 2013, after an internal review of its whole money-service-business book, Barclays gave Dahabshiil notice that it would withdraw its banking services. The reason cited was money-laundering and terrorist-financing risk.
Dahabshiil went to court, arguing that Barclays was abusing a dominant position in banking for UK money remitters. In November 2013, Mr Justice Henderson granted an interim injunction keeping the account open until trial, finding a serious issue to be tried on whether Barclays was dominant and had abused that position. The case never reached trial: the two sides settled, with Barclays keeping the account open long enough for Dahabshiil to move to other banks. The withdrawal was a category decision, in which Barclays was cutting its exposure to money service businesses as a class, especially those sending money to Somalia. Barclays’ own evidence tied the decision to regulatory exposure and the cost of serving the sector: an early draft of its new standards required each customer to bring in at least £100,000 a year in revenue, and the judge observed that keeping the claimants on would still be profitable for Barclays, if probably not at the level the review demanded.
Somalia is the extreme case, but it is not the only one. Pakistan is a far larger economy, with a functioning central bank, a regulated banking sector and a sovereign credit rating. From June 2018 to October 2022 it sat on the FATF grey list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring, a label that banks around the world are encouraged to factor into their own risk assessments. Nobody has an official figure for hundi, Pakistan’s version of hawala, but industry estimates have run from around $8 billion to $15 billion a year, and the exchange-company association behind the higher figure said the real volume could be double. The UAE is Pakistan’s second-largest source of formal remittances, behind only Saudi Arabia. Some hundi traffic settles payments for under-declared imports and other illegal transactions, but much of its staying power in that corridor comes from something plainer: fast settlement at competitive fees, without a bank’s paperwork and questions, is exactly what many senders want.
The regulatory framework presupposes functioning banking infrastructure. Applying it uniformly to countries without that infrastructure is a category error. Nikos Passas of Northeastern University, who coined the term “informal value transfer systems” in 1999, later concluded that the literature on these systems, the literature the policy was built on, was “not only lacking depth, but is also replete with inconsistencies and inaccurate information.”
By the standards of the communities that use it, hawala was already operating in the open. De-risking removed the formal alternative from markets where it had barely existed, and then treated the continued operation of hawala as evidence that more regulation was needed. The consequences of that circle are concrete: families paying higher fees for slower transfers, aid organizations unable to move money into crisis zones, and a central bank in Mogadishu still working, years later, to build the compliance systems that correspondent banks demand.
Banks chose to de-bank entire populations. There was no malice in it: compliance officers were doing their jobs and risk committees were applying their frameworks. Those were still choices, however unavoidable the language of risk made them sound.
What the word means
Back in Deira, the shopfronts are still open and the phones are still ringing. A man behind one of the counters is completing a transaction that will take hours and, on a $200 transfer, can cost the sender just a few dollars in fees, connecting two people across a border without correspondent banks, wire infrastructure, deposit insurance, or the participation of any institution that a Western regulator has ever licensed.
The usual question is why an informal, primitive system persists despite the evident advantages of modern banking. It assumes that hawala is the latecomer, waiting to be replaced. It is often faster and cheaper than the institutions that labeled it informal, and for hundreds of millions of people it is the only remittance infrastructure within reach, because the formal system depends on infrastructure that exists mainly in rich countries and is now systematically absent from the places with the greatest need.
The Bank of England named itself formal in 1694, and the system it was calling informal had been running for the better part of a thousand years before that. Hawala has kept running for more than three hundred and thirty years since. The labels recorded who registered what, and who got to name the thing after they’d registered it.
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Further reading
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Moneyland: The Inside Story of the Crooks and Kleptocrats Who Rule the WorldInvestigates how Western banks and offshore intermediaries move and conceal wealth, providing context for the article’s comparison with hawala.
Money: The True Story of a Made-Up ThingExplains money as a social agreement and traces banking and alternative monetary arrangements, supplying background to hawala’s reliance on trust and obligations.
Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World EconomyExplains dollar clearing, payment networks and post-9/11 financial surveillance behind the article’s account of Western banking power.Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic WarfareChokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic WarfareProvides a reported history of sanctions and exclusion from dollar banking, explaining incentives to develop alternative payment channels.Recommended videos
1:36How does the hawala system work? | BusinessA 90-second walk-through of a hawala transfer, from the customer’s cash to the broker’s phone call and later settlement.
42:01Hawala, dans les secrets de la banque clandestine | #InvestigationBelgian public broadcaster’s investigation inside hawala networks in Europe, both legitimate remittance use and criminal abuse (French original, English audio track).Cite this article
Owen Parker. “Hawala – the financial system that runs largely outside Western banks.” Eikleaf, 11 May 2026, updated 2 November 2026. https://www.eikleaf.com/hawala-the-financial-system-that-operates-entirely-outside-western-banks/
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Some contents of this page were generated and/or edited with the help of a Generative AI.
Media
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