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Last updated: · 13 min read

In brief
Germany ran the world’s largest current account surplus in 2016. Its finance minister still blamed the deficit countries themselves, with Greece’s output down by roughly a quarter. But every surplus implies a deficit somewhere. Inside the euro, Germany’s partners could not devalue, so austerity and mass unemployment did the adjusting. With no global rule penalising surpluses, Berlin rewrote its debt rules only in 2025, with a €500 billion fund for neglected infrastructure. Under the system the world got instead of Keynes’s plan, the surplus country still decides when to adjust.

In 2015, Germany’s current account surplus reached roughly 8 percent of GDP, second only to China’s in absolute terms. The following year it overtook China outright to become the world’s largest. The distinction received muted coverage.

Greece was mired in a depression that had erased roughly a quarter of its pre-crisis output. Spain’s unemployment was above 22 percent. Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s finance minister and the most powerful advocate of the austerity conditions attached to the Greek bailouts, was still saying what he’d been saying since 2010: the deficit countries had no one to blame but themselves.

Schäuble’s accusation ran into an accounting identity that binds both sides of the ledger. Global current account balances must sum to zero, exactly and by accounting definition, the way debits must equal credits. Every surplus implies a deficit somewhere. And because government fiscal choices are the lever most directly under political control, a persistent budget surplus, unless private borrowing rises to offset it, tends mechanically to push the current account into surplus. The fiscal choice is a policy; the external position is one of its consequences.

Norway, Singapore and Germany, the countries examined here, have run persistent surpluses through different mechanisms and for different stated reasons. In each case the surplus comes from a choice and lands on the other side of someone else’s ledger. The question is who made that choice and who bears its cost.

Norway — the cleanest case

Norway’s surplus is the easiest of the three to defend. Its Government Pension Fund Global held assets worth roughly $2 trillion at the end of 2025, making it the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world by assets. The fund owns about 1.5 percent of all listed companies globally plus government and corporate bonds and prime real estate across the world’s major markets. Norway’s current account surplus ran at about 15 percent of GDP in 2024 and 14 percent in 2025 as European energy prices eased from their post-invasion peaks.

Oil and gas revenues do not flow into the operating budget. They go into the GPFG and are invested abroad, and spending from the fund is meant to follow its expected real return over time, currently set at 3 percent of the fund’s value. This arrangement prevents the oil windfall from inflating the domestic economy, distorting wages and crowding out non-resource industries. That is the Dutch disease, which has hollowed out natural resource exporters from Angola to Azerbaijan. It also prevents the generation that happens to live over the oil field from spending the inheritance.

But Norway’s non-oil structural budget deficit for 2026 is budgeted at about 12.6 percent of trend mainland GDP. Without the petroleum sector, Norway runs a deficit, so the surplus rests on geological luck, carefully managed, rather than on fiscal discipline enforced by institutions.

“Fiscal discipline” is the language in which surpluses are routinely praised, and Norway is frequently offered as evidence that discipline produces security. Strip away the oil revenues and what remains is a well-managed inheritance. The discipline is real, but it is applied to an asset that dropped into Norway’s lap, and countries without North Sea oil fields have no such asset to apply it to.

The GPFG’s assets don’t sit inert. Its roughly $2 trillion is a claim on the rest of the global economy: the bonds are loans to foreign governments and companies, the shares and buildings are ownership stakes in their businesses and property. When Norway’s fund buys British gilts, it funds the British government’s deficit. When it buys equities in a German manufacturer, it holds a claim on German productive capital.

The fiscal rule revision

In 2017, Norway lowered the expected real return that guides spending from the fund from 4 to 3 percent of the fund’s value. Expected real returns on globally diversified portfolios had declined since the rule was written in 2001, and the original assumption no longer held. The revision shows a framework that adapts. It also shows how a rule that seemed adequate at its founding can start working against its stated purpose as conditions change.

Singapore — the compression machine

Singapore’s current account surplus was about 17 percent of GDP in 2024 and 16.7 percent in 2025. The government budget recorded a surplus of about 2 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2025. Unlike Norway, Singapore has no oil, no gas, no extractable resources. It is a city-state of roughly 744 square kilometres, and its surplus outstrips Norway’s as a share of GDP.

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The clearest policy behind it is the Central Provident Fund. For citizens and long-standing permanent residents aged 55 and below, CPF contributions total 37 percent of wages, 20 percent from the employee and 17 percent from the employer, paid into government-managed accounts that can be drawn on mainly for retirement, healthcare and approved housing purchases. Because the employer’s share is paid on top of salary, that is close to a third of a typical worker’s total pay, set aside at source under compulsory law, with the government controlling both access and interest rates. Singapore’s household consumption as a share of GDP sits persistently below the levels typical of high-income economies, and the savings rate behind it is maintained by legislative design as well as by cultural preference.

Singapore’s Ministry of Finance states the rationale openly: as “a small country with no natural resources,” Singapore holds reserves that let the government respond to crises such as COVID-19 “without borrowing heavily and passing on the financial burden to future generations.” The 1997 Asian financial crisis, which devastated regional economies that lacked comparable buffers, is not an abstraction in Singapore’s institutional memory. The strategic logic is sound on its own terms, and it leaves the arithmetic that follows untouched.

Singapore produces more than it consumes at its income level. By accounting identity, the gap shows up as a surplus with the rest of the world, which collectively spends more than it produces by the same amount. Whether this was intended, accepted as a side effect, or not considered when the CPF was designed doesn’t change the external consequence.

Inside Singapore, the cost falls on what workers can spend now. CPF money is not frozen: it pays for flats, mortgages and medical bills, and later for retirement. But the law decides when it can be spent and on what. A worker earning SGD 5,000 a month sees SGD 1,000 go into mandatory accounts before any of it can be spent freely. Across millions of workers, that holds back the household spending that would otherwise narrow the external surplus.

The accounting of fiscal tightness

Singapore’s official government budget excludes revenue from land sales, which is added to the Past Reserves rather than the operating account; only part of the investment return on those reserves flows back into the budget. In a city-state where the government owns most of the land and land is extraordinarily scarce, the sums are large, and they never appear in the headline budget figure as revenue. By analogy, urban land is Singapore’s North Sea. The parallel with Norway is closer than is usually acknowledged: both countries turn a finite national asset into reserves held outside the operating budget and spend only part of the return, so neither headline budget tells the whole fiscal story.

Germany — the moralizer

The deficits that mirror Norway’s and Singapore’s surpluses are spread thinly across global markets. For Germany’s first decade in the euro, its counterparts were easy to name.

Germany’s current account was roughly in balance, slightly in deficit, when the euro launched in 1999. By 2007 the surplus had reached more than 6 percent of GDP, and by 2016, at close to 9 percent, it was the largest current account surplus in the world in absolute terms, larger than China’s. In the years before the 2008 crisis, the countries on the deficit side of Germany’s ledger were fellow eurozone members: Spain, Greece, Portugal and Italy, with France slipping into deficit too. They shared a currency and a monetary policy with the country whose structural choices were widening the gap, and there was no exchange rate mechanism available to correct it.

Two forces did the most to entrench the surplus. The first was wage restraint. Agenda 2010 and the Hartz reforms, which Chancellor Schröder introduced from 2003 and implemented in stages through 2005, reinforced it at the bottom of the labour market. The legislation restructured unemployment benefits, reduced replacement rates and eligibility durations, weakened union bargaining leverage, and expanded mini-jobs and temporary contracts. German wage restraint had begun earlier, in 1995, driven by high unemployment, globalisation and the threat of offshoring, with unions and works councils accepting moderation; the Hartz legislation mainly pushed down wages at the bottom of the scale. Whatever the origin, the result was a widening competitiveness gap. Nominal unit labour costs in Germany barely moved between 1999 and 2007, while they rose roughly 22 percent in Italy and about 27 percent in both Spain and Greece.

Inside a single currency, a divergence of that magnitude cannot be corrected by devaluation. It has to close through relative wages, prices and productivity: faster growth in Germany or slower growth in the deficit countries. In practice the second route carried most of the load. It meant years of mass unemployment and was politically devastating for whoever was governing when the bill arrived.

Restrained wages also held down German consumption and imports, so the trade surplus was not being recycled as demand for its partners’ goods. The money accumulated in financial institutions and corporate balance sheets and flowed outward as capital, including as lending to the southern European markets then running deficits against Germany. German and French banks were the largest foreign lenders to the periphery, with close to $1 trillion of exposure to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain by the end of 2009, most of it to banks, property developers and other private borrowers rather than governments.

When capital inflows reversed, the deficits became emergencies. Spain was running a current account deficit of about 9 percent of GDP in 2008; Greece and Portugal were higher still, at roughly 15 and 12 percent. The adjustment was not shared: German domestic demand did not grow nearly enough to offset the cuts elsewhere, and no eurozone fiscal mechanism distributed the burden. Austerity, internal devaluation and mass unemployment all fell on the deficit side. Greece lost roughly a quarter of its GDP between 2008 and 2013. Spain’s unemployment peaked at 26 percent in the first quarter of 2013, and youth unemployment exceeded 55 percent at the same point; an entire cohort entered the labour market during the worst years and carried the damage forward. By 2016 Spain, Italy and Portugal were running current account surpluses of their own, and Germany’s was still growing.

Wolfgang Schäuble presided over Germany’s record surplus while pressing hardest for the conditionality of the Greek bailouts: austerity severe enough to collapse domestic demand and with it tax revenues, which made the fiscal targets harder to hit. The IMF’s own chief economist later showed that the forecasts behind those programmes had badly underestimated how much damage the cuts would do to growth. Schäuble’s stated position, repeated throughout the crisis, was that the peripheral countries had lived beyond their means. It left out that German banks had lent them much of the money to do so, that European governments, Germany’s foremost among them, had designed the currency union in which they could not adjust, and that when the structure failed, Berlin insisted that the cost of the correction fall overwhelmingly on the borrowers. Private bondholders did take a 53.5 percent haircut on Greek bonds in the 2012 restructuring, but the austerity and the depression stayed with the debtor countries.

The second force came after the crash. Germany’s Schuldenbremse, the constitutional debt brake written into the Basic Law in 2009, limits the federal structural deficit to 0.35 percent of GDP. From 2014 the Merkel-Schäuble government went beyond even that ceiling with the schwarze Null, or “black zero”: no net new federal borrowing at all. With the state now saving alongside households and companies, the surplus kept climbing to its 2016 record.

The schwarze Null was running up a domestic bill of its own, which didn’t feature in Schäuble’s statements. The investment backlog German municipalities report was up almost 16 percent in a single year by 2024, and the latest estimate puts it at €231 billion. School buildings alone account for €68.9 billion of deferred investment, and roads and transport infrastructure for €53.7 billion. Germany’s bridges, hospitals, water infrastructure, and digital networks were degrading under the same fiscal framework that had been prescribed, with considerable moral authority, to the countries that couldn’t afford their own.

Twelve years after Greece’s economy hit its post-crisis floor in 2013, Germany rewrote its own rules. On March 18, 2025, the outgoing Bundestag, meeting in special session, voted 512 to 206 to amend the Basic Law. The amendment exempted defence spending above 1 percent of GDP from the Schuldenbremse and established a €500 billion fund for infrastructure and climate investment, worth more than 11 percent of Germany’s 2024 GDP, entirely outside the debt brake’s scope.

The stated triggers were Russia’s continuing war in Ukraine, the deterioration of the transatlantic relationship, and Germany’s visible economic stagnation.

Budget surplus and current account surplus — the accounting link

The schwarze Null was a government budget policy. Germany’s current account surplus is an economy-wide figure: the aggregate excess of national saving over national investment across all sectors. The two are related but not identical. The sectoral balances identity makes the arithmetic explicit: Private Sector Balance + Government Balance = Current Account Balance. (Equivalently, the domestic private, government and foreign sectors’ balances sum to zero.) A government running a deficit can still preside over a large current account surplus if private-sector saving more than offsets it. Germany did exactly that in 2009 and 2010, when the government ran deficits of 3 to 4.5 percent of GDP while the current account surplus held above 5 percent. In the black-zero years the government and the private sector were both net savers, with households saving heavily and companies retaining earnings. When both public and private sectors are net savers, the current account surplus is their sum. Fiscal policy was not the only driver of Germany’s surplus, but it was the driver most directly under political control.
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The architecture of non-accountability

Nothing in the international system obliged Germany to stop. In the negotiations that led to the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, John Maynard Keynes proposed a new international monetary unit, the bancor, to govern trade imbalances. The proposal’s distinguishing feature was symmetry: surplus countries would be charged interest on excess bancor holdings, just as deficit countries faced penalties for persistent deficits. The mechanism would have distributed adjustment pressure across both sides of the ledger, making it costly for creditor nations to accumulate indefinitely while debtor nations were forced to contract. The United States, whose chief negotiator was Harry Dexter White, rejected it. The United States was then the world’s largest surplus economy and had no interest in a system that penalised creditors. The IMF that emerged from Bretton Woods has extensive conditionality for deficit countries; its only weapon against surplus countries, a “scarce currency” clause, has never been used.

Deficit countries face market discipline that surplus countries do not: rising sovereign bond yields, capital flight, potential currency crises that force adjustment regardless of political preference. Surplus countries face no comparable mechanism; their assets are bid up and their borrowing costs fall. The adjustment pressure runs in one direction only, and the post-war international financial architecture built it that way.

The eurozone compounded this by removing exchange rates as even a partial corrective. Germany’s competitive advantage within the single currency couldn’t be eroded by the mechanism that partially constrains surpluses between countries with floating currencies. The European Commission’s Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure flags current account surpluses averaging more than 6 percent of GDP over three years for closer scrutiny; Germany has been flagged repeatedly. The enforcement mechanism has never been used against a surplus country to meaningful effect.

The IMF, in annual assessments first issued in 2012, has repeatedly called Germany’s current account surplus substantially stronger than warranted by economic fundamentals and desirable policy settings; in 2019 the IMF put the excess at roughly four to five percent of GDP. More than two-thirds of a panel of European economists agreed that German surpluses posed a threat to the eurozone economy. Berlin consistently answered with polite non-engagement.

Germany is now borrowing more. The special fund will deploy €500 billion over twelve years on roads, schools, bridges and digital networks. The identity now points the other way: a government borrowing to invest adds to domestic demand, and unless private saving rises to match it, imports should rise relative to exports and the surplus narrow.

Germany’s current account surplus had already fallen to about 4.5 percent of GDP in 2025, around €203 billion, down €52 billion from the year before. Some of that reflects economic weakness; the effect of the spending is still to come.

What the 2025 reform leaves open is why it came when it did. A decade of Greek austerity did not change German fiscal policy, nor did half a decade of Spanish unemployment above 20 percent, repeated IMF warnings politely absorbed, or a clear majority of surveyed economists just as politely ignored. Germany moved when deferred repairs piled up in its own schools and roads, and when a war being fought on European soil left its military exposed.

Keynes’s bancor, drafted during the Second World War, would have charged interest on a surplus like Germany’s while it built up; the system the world got instead left the timing to the surplus country.

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Cite this article
Lena Martin. “The countries that run permanent surpluses — and the uncomfortable reasons why.” Eikleaf, 19 May 2026, updated 2 November 2026. https://www.eikleaf.com/the-countries-that-run-permanent-budget-surpluses-and-the-uncomfortable-reasons-why/

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