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Last updated: · 16 min read

In brief
In 2002 Argentina’s public debt roughly tripled as a share of its economy, to about 150% of GDP, without any borrowing spree. It grew mainly because the peso stopped being worth a dollar, making the dollar debt three to four times heavier in pesos. That arithmetic runs in every country that must borrow in money it cannot print. It is not simply bad governance. In the 1990s, economic size predicted which countries could borrow abroad in their own currency far better than inflation records did. The next time the Fed raises rates, the same arithmetic starts working again.

In 2002, Argentina’s public debt roughly tripled as a share of its economy, from about half of GDP to roughly 150%. The government had not gone on a borrowing or spending spree. The debt grew mainly because the peso stopped being worth a dollar. The Convertibility Plan, which had pegged the two currencies 1:1 since 1991, collapsed in January. By June the peso had fallen to nearly 4 per dollar. The dollar debt remained the same number of dollars, but in peso terms it was now three to four times heavier. Bonds issued to compensate the banks and unpaid arrears added the rest of the rise. Measured against everything its people earned, saved and paid taxes in, the country was suddenly crushed under its obligations.

The arithmetic behind that jump is simple, and it applies to every country that has to borrow in money it cannot print. Mostly, those are the smaller economies.

The automatic debt amplifier

Start with a simple case. A country owes $10 billion to foreign creditors. At 2 local units to the dollar, that debt equals 20 billion in local currency. Then the exchange rate moves to 4:1, whether because the government devalues, the market forces the currency down or a peg breaks. The same $10 billion is now 40 billion local units. In the currency that matters at home, the debt has doubled, with no new borrowing and no new political decision.

Apply this to Argentina. By late 2001 the country owed roughly $150 billion to foreign creditors, and in the last days of that year it stopped paying on about $81 billion of government bonds, at the time the largest sovereign default in history. When the peso broke from its 1:1 peg and slid toward 4:1, the local-currency weight of those obligations more than tripled. GDP shrank 11% in 2002. Prices, essentially flat since the mid-1990s, rose 41% in a single year. Within months more than half the population had fallen into poverty.

The mechanism doesn’t only activate in crises. It operates continuously, in both directions. When a country’s currency weakens modestly against the dollar, say by losing 10% of its value over a year, the local-currency value of its dollar debt rises by about 11%. When the Federal Reserve raises interest rates, capital tends to flow toward dollar assets, strengthening the dollar against developing-economy currencies and raising the local-currency burden of dollar-denominated debt across dozens of countries at once.

The Fed’s March 2022–July 2023 rate-hiking cycle raised the federal funds rate by 525 basis points. This was US monetary policy, set to bring down US inflation. As the dollar strengthened, the Turkish lira, the Argentine peso, the Colombian peso and the Egyptian pound each lost 15% or more of their value against the dollar in 2022 alone. Domestic inflation did much of the damage in Ankara and Buenos Aires, but the surging dollar pushed every one of them in the same direction. Every percentage point of dollar strengthening raised the local-currency debt burden in each of those countries, with no new borrowing, through the same arithmetic that operated in Buenos Aires in 2002.

Coverage of developing-country debt crises seldom names this as a proximate cause; the usual suspects are fiscal mismanagement, governance failures and policy errors. Those factors are sometimes real. But the amplifier runs before, during and after a crisis, because it is built into the architecture of who gets to borrow in what currency. A government can shrink its reach by moving more of its borrowing into its own currency. It cannot switch it off while it still owes dollars.

Original sin

Why do developing countries borrow in foreign currencies at all? The obvious explanation is governance: lenders won’t trust currencies from countries with poor inflation records. It puts the problem with the borrowers and implies the condition is earned and therefore curable: once a country fixes its inflation record and rebuilds its credibility, lenders will eventually accept its currency.

In 1999, Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann gave this condition a name: “original sin” — the situation where a country’s domestic currency “cannot be used to borrow abroad or to borrow long term, even domestically.” A country with original sin cannot issue international debt in its own currency. It has to borrow in someone else’s, which means the exchange rate amplifier is always running.

The governance explanation held up poorly against the data of the 1990s. Inflation history turned out to be a weak predictor of whether a country could borrow internationally in its own currency. Countries with decades of price stability still couldn’t escape original sin, and countries that had done everything “right” by the conventional metrics were still borrowing in dollars.

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What did track original sin in those years was country size, specifically the size of the economy relative to global financial markets. Large economies could issue internationally in their own currencies. Small and medium economies mostly couldn’t. In 1993–1998, developing countries accounted for about 10% of international debt, while their own currencies accounted for less than 1% of it. They borrowed abroad, but almost never in their own money.

The clearest exceptions to original sin were the issuers of the five currencies that dominate international bond markets: the US dollar, the euro, the yen, the pound sterling and the Swiss franc. Of the nearly $5.8 trillion in international securities outstanding in 1999–2001, $5.6 trillion was denominated in those five currencies. A handful of smaller economies, among them Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and several Central European countries, had partly escaped too, but they were few. The big five are the economies whose currencies serve as global reserve currencies or major trading currencies. What most of them share is size, with Switzerland the financial-centre exception: they are large enough that international investors have reason to hold their currencies directly, which creates real demand for assets denominated in them.

Original sin, in the data of the 1990s and early 2000s, is mostly a matter of scale: economic mass predicts it far better than inflation history does, and it is remarkably persistent: countries that clean up their inflation records often keep borrowing in dollars for decades. The way exchange rate movements amplify debt is therefore not simply a consequence of governance failure; it is part of the setting in which governance failures happen.

Original sin redux

Since the mid-2000s, some emerging markets have issued bonds denominated in their own currencies to international investors, a development sometimes read as original sin dissolving under the pressure of financial innovation. Agustín Carstens and Hyun Song Shin of the Bank for International Settlements judged this progress real but incomplete, and coined "original sin redux" for what had happened instead: the currency mismatch had migrated. When a country issues local-currency bonds to foreign investors, those investors hold the currency risk. When the local currency falls, they sell, and the capital outflows push the currency down further, reproducing the original problem through a different channel. Borrowing abroad in local currency does not end the mismatch. It shifts it onto the balance sheets of global lenders, so a tightening abroad still squeezes emerging-market financial conditions, though less than dollar debt would. The countries that have moved furthest from dollar borrowing tend to have strong institutions, deep domestic bond markets and credible inflation targeting, so policy can change how much of the mismatch a country carries, even where it cannot make it disappear.

Argentina: the repeating trap

The Convertibility Plan of 1991 was a reasonable response to a real crisis. Argentina’s hyperinflation had reached about 3,000% a year in 1989, and the dollar peg ended it. But the peg also tied Argentina to dollar-denominated external debt throughout the 1990s. Borrowing internationally meant borrowing in dollars, and keeping the peg credible meant financing current account deficits from abroad. Fiscal policy that stayed too loose even in the growth years made the pile bigger. By the end of the decade, the architecture had become a trap.

By 2001, Argentina’s external debt stood at roughly $150 billion, and the government owed about $81 billion in bonds to private creditors at home and abroad. The IMF was pressing for fiscal adjustment, meaning deficit reduction and public sector wage cuts, to maintain the conditions under which the peg could hold. The adjustment deepened the recession. The deeper recession cut tax revenues and widened the deficit, and that called for more adjustment. In late 2001, the IMF refused to release a scheduled tranche, accelerating the crisis. The peg broke in January 2002, and the peso neared 4:1 against the dollar by June. Public debt roughly tripled as a share of GDP, to about 150%, in the time it took an exchange rate to move.

By 2018, Argentina’s policy framework looked nothing like 2001’s: there was no peg, the central bank ran an inflation-targeting regime, and the government was committed to cutting its deficit. On paper, the country no longer looked like the fiscally irresponsible villain of the conventional debt-crisis story.

But Argentina had also returned to international markets in force, lifting its external debt from about $177 billion in 2015 to about $226 billion in 2017. The peso still lost more than half its value in the first eight months of 2018.

The government secured a $50 billion IMF loan, the largest in IMF history at the time, later expanded to $57 billion. The crisis happened anyway. The European debt network Eurodad counted more conditions in the 2018 arrangement than in the 2000 program, even though the IMF claimed to have internalized the lessons of the previous crisis. The IMF’s own later review found that the program did not adequately address Argentina’s deeper weaknesses: fragile public finances, high inflation and an economy that still saved in dollars. When residents moved their savings out of pesos, the falling exchange rate raised the peso value of the public debt, and the unresolved currency mismatch turned a run on the peso into a debt crisis.

Argentina's serial defaults

Argentina has defaulted on its sovereign debt nine times, a record usually read as serial irresponsibility, the mark of a political culture incapable of maintaining debt sustainability. Policy failures are part of that record, but each played out on top of the same currency mismatch. Any shock large enough to weaken the peso enlarges the dollar-denominated debt in local-currency terms, potentially beyond the government's fiscal capacity even when it has been managing its finances responsibly. Repeated IMF recourse reflects both the mistakes and a debt structure that keeps turning shocks into crises.

Turkey: same trap, different architecture

The Turkish crisis of 2018 illustrates something the Argentine case can obscure: original sin doesn’t require a sovereign debt crisis to express itself. By 2018, Turkey’s problem sat mainly on the corporate sector’s balance sheet rather than the government’s.

That year Turkey owed about $181 billion in external debt falling due within a year, much of it owed by its banks and companies. Already by the mid-2010s, around 60% of its companies’ debt was in foreign currency, and in construction, a sector with revenue almost entirely in Turkish lira, the share was roughly 70%.

The companies earned lira and owed dollars, which put the same mechanism to work on a different balance sheet. In August 2018 alone, the lira lost about a quarter of its value against the dollar: a dollar cost a third more in lira at the end of the month than at the start.

The banks immediately faced pressure from corporations that couldn’t service their foreign currency obligations on lira revenues, and restructuring demands flooded in. The strain landed on the banks, but its source was the exchange rate amplifier, working this time on company balance sheets.

Then came 2021. In March, President Erdogan dismissed central bank governor Naci Ağbal, who had been raising rates to fight inflation, and replaced him with Şahap Kavcıoğlu, who from September onward cut the policy rate from 19% to 14% in four steps. The lira fell immediately on the dismissal announcement and kept falling. By the end of 2021 it had lost 44% of its value for the year, and December inflation hit 36%.

Erdogan’s monetary theory, that high interest rates cause inflation rather than suppress it, is wrong, and firing Ağbal to act on it, in a country already exposed to the dollar, was a serious governance failure. The damage spread further because Turkish companies still carried large foreign-currency debts. The same interest rate decision in a country whose companies borrowed mainly in their own currency would have produced inflation, currency weakness and possibly a recession. It would not also have raised the lira cost of companies’ dollar and euro debts with every point the lira fell, squeezing firms whose revenues stayed in lira.

Governance failure explains when and how the 2021–2022 crisis unfolded; the currency mismatch helps explain why it cut so deep. An account that keeps only the first puts all the blame on the government.

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The IMF and the architecture of the trap

The IMF’s crisis-resolution logic isn’t irrational on its own terms. Lend at below-market rates in exchange for fiscal adjustment; adjustment restores investor confidence; confidence brings back access to international capital markets; and market access lets the country roll over its debt and resume growth. For a country with original sin, though, the exit from crisis runs through the dollar system. Market access mostly means access to dollar-denominated international capital, so the country emerges from crisis re-exposed to the same mechanism that produced it.

In Argentina in 2001, IMF conditionality required deficit reduction and commitment to the peg, deepening the recession while the peg was under lethal pressure from a current account deficit that the peso’s overvaluation was generating. In 2018, the $50–57 billion program attached more conditions than the one that preceded the 2001 collapse. The IMF is not acting against Argentina’s interests as it understands them, and it also urges countries to build local-currency bond markets. But that is slow work, and a rescue program runs on a shorter clock: for Argentina, regaining market access meant borrowing in dollars again.

Zambia's 2020 default

In November 2020, Zambia became the first African sovereign to default during the COVID era, missing a Eurobond coupon payment. The kwacha lost roughly a third of its value against the dollar in 2020. Zambia's external debt consisted largely of dollar-denominated Eurobonds, issued from 2012 to 2015 and totaling $3 billion, along with Chinese loans contracted in foreign currencies and more than $4 billion in export supplier credits by 2021, with China the main lender. As in Argentina and Turkey, every point of kwacha depreciation increased the local-currency weight of those dollar obligations.

Debt relief negotiations stretched over years. Zambia applied in early 2021 under the G20's new Common Framework, but bringing Chinese lenders, Western bondholders and other creditors onto comparable terms proved slow. Zambia reached a deal with its official creditors in June 2023, agreed terms with its bondholders in March 2024 and completed the bond exchange only in June 2024, more than three and a half years after the default. The drawn-out process reflected the gap between where debt distress happens, in developing economies with foreign-currency liabilities, and where the institutions for resolving it were built.

What reform would require

The partial escape route, borrowing abroad in local currency, helps without finishing the job. It reduces a country’s exposure to foreign shocks and gives its own interest rates more grip on the economy. But part of the currency mismatch moves to foreign investors’ balance sheets, and when those investors exit under stress, capital outflows drive further depreciation.

Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza proposed an index of emerging-market currencies, with the World Bank and other AAA-rated international institutions issuing bonds denominated in it. That would give international investors diversified exposure to a portfolio of emerging market currencies without single-currency bets, and could create real demand for EM-currency assets without concentrating risk on any single balance sheet. The proposal hasn’t been adopted at scale. It requires coordination among institutions that don’t have strong incentives to coordinate, and it would reduce the demand for dollar-denominated assets, which the US benefits from.

The more fundamental reform was proposed during the Second World War and shelved before it could be implemented. Between 1941 and 1943, as Britain’s chief negotiator on the postwar order, John Maynard Keynes proposed a supranational currency, the bancor, for international trade settlement, to be issued by an International Clearing Union.

Under that plan, no single nation’s monetary policy would generate reserve currency privilege, because the reserve currency would be issued by an institution accountable to all trading nations rather than one of them. The system would impose symmetric adjustment pressure: countries running persistent trade surpluses would pay charges on their excess bancor balances, just as deficit countries would on their overdrafts, so creditor nations as well as debtor nations would be penalized for imbalances. Under Keynes’s proposal, the United States’ persistent trade surplus in the early postwar period would have generated pressure on the US to reduce it. The system that was adopted instead allowed the US to run balance-of-payments deficits while foreign central banks accumulated the resulting dollar reserves, structuring the global financial system around a currency it alone controlled.

The United States never accepted the Keynes plan. By the April 1944 Joint Statement that set the agenda for Bretton Woods, the design had already swung toward Harry Dexter White’s Stabilization Fund, and the system agreed that July was anchored, in practice, to the gold-convertible dollar. At stake in that choice was which country would extract what Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, then Finance Minister of France, described in the 1960s as the “exorbitant privilege” of reserve currency status: lower borrowing costs, the capacity to run deficits that would trigger debt crises in any developing economy, the ability to conduct monetary policy for domestic purposes regardless of the consequences for those holding dollar-denominated obligations globally.

The US secured that privilege in 1944 and still holds it. The Federal Reserve sets rates for American purposes, and when the dollar moves, the local-currency burden of debt in dozens of developing economies moves with it. Reform on that scale, whether a multipolar reserve currency system or a Keynes-style clearing institution imposing symmetric adjustment on surplus and deficit countries alike, would require the US to accept a meaningful reduction in that privilege. Nothing in the historical record suggests it is willing to. Within international institutions, the countries with the most to gain from reform have the least power to achieve it, while the countries able to block it are the ones currently extracting the benefit.

The 1997 Asian financial crisis

Thailand's baht had been pegged to the dollar. By mid-1997 the peg was under speculative attack, sustained in part by dollar-denominated corporate debt accumulated during the investment boom of the preceding decade. Thailand unpegged the baht in July 1997, the baht fell sharply, and dollar-denominated obligations, expressed in baht, became far more expensive. Within months Indonesia, South Korea and Malaysia were drawn into the same dynamic. Each had accumulated foreign-currency corporate debt during the boom, and each saw that debt burden amplified when its currency fell under contagion pressure. Malaysia refused an IMF program and imposed capital controls. In Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea, the IMF's response of austerity, sharp interest rate increases and structural adjustment conditions was contested at the time and has remained contested.

Joseph Stiglitz, who served as chief economist at the World Bank during the crisis, argued in 2002 that IMF-imposed fiscal retrenchment made serious recessions deeper, and that interest rate increases generated cascading bankruptcies that worsened confidence rather than restoring it. Economists still debate whether IMF policy deepened the contraction or merely failed to prevent it. The mechanism behind the initial debt amplification, currencies falling against dollar-denominated obligations, is not in dispute. It was the same mechanism at work in Argentina and Turkey.

The conventional narrative and its beneficiaries

Return to early 2002. The peso had been worth a dollar; within months it was worth barely a quarter of a dollar.

Argentina’s fiscal management through the 1990s was often chaotic, politically constrained, and sometimes reckless. Yet the 2002 debt explosion was primarily generated by a mechanism no Argentine government could switch off on its own. That amplifier was built into a currency mismatch that Argentina could not escape simply by managing its finances better, because original sin at the time tracked economic size and the structure of international financial markets far more closely than the quality of domestic governance.

The usual account keeps the fiscal failures and drops the mechanism. It reads the crisis as a consequence of Argentine failure, recommends austerity and conditionality as the cure, and treats a fresh round of dollar borrowing as the exit from crisis, which re-exposes the country to the same mechanism in the next cycle.

That account also suits the countries whose currencies others have to borrow in. By locating the cause of debt crises in the countries that suffer them, it keeps the design of the international monetary system out of the explanation. It makes conditionality look like a rational response to governance failure, and it leaves the exorbitant privilege of the reserve-currency issuers out of any standard account of what produced the crisis. The next time the Fed raises rates, the same arithmetic will start working on every country that owes dollars it cannot print.

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Cite this article
Lena Martin. “The geography of debt: why certain nations borrow in currencies they don’t control.” Eikleaf, 19 May 2026, updated 2 November 2026. https://www.eikleaf.com/the-geography-of-debt-why-certain-nations-borrow-in-currencies-they-dont-control/

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