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Last updated: · 16 min read

In brief
Russia sent $125.2 million to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2017, the final payment on a Soviet debt for Yugoslav goods. Both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had been gone for over two decades. A state’s debts can outlive it, yet no treaty in force says who pays. Bargaining, not law, picks the payer. Russia took all Soviet foreign debt for all foreign assets; Sudan kept the whole debt after losing some three-quarters of its oil production. A 1927 doctrine lets debts a despot runs up against his people fall with him, but creditor institutions keep it out of the rules.

In August 2017, Russia’s Finance Ministry transferred $125.2 million to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was the final payment on a debt the Soviet Union had contracted more than a quarter century earlier for goods imported from Yugoslavia, a country that by then had also been gone for over two decades.

Neither party to the original debt existed anymore. The USSR dissolved in December 1991; Yugoslavia came apart over 1991 and 1992, as one republic after another broke away. Yet governments and creditors had agreed that this debt would survive both dissolutions, and had settled who owed it and who would collect.

The void

No treaty in force settles what happens to sovereign debt when a state dissolves, and the world’s big creditor nations never signed up to the one that tried.

The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts was adopted in 1983. It needs fifteen states to ratify or accede before it can enter into force. As of October 2026 it has seven parties, and it has never entered into force.

What the Convention says

Article 41, which governs the dissolution of a state, would have made the predecessor's debt pass to the successor states "in equitable proportions, taking into account, in particular, the property, rights and interests which pass to the successor States in relation to that State debt." The rule had an exit built in: it applied "unless the successor States otherwise agree." Article 38 set out separate rules for former colonies. Seven more states signed without ratifying. The major creditor nations (the United States, Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom) are in neither group.

Every major creditor nation stayed out. They were not alone. The Convention was adopted by a split vote of 54 to 11, with 11 abstentions, and most of the world never joined. Its drafting gave governments reasons to hesitate: it leaned on vague appeals to equity, was built mainly around decolonisation, and offered little guidance for a messy multi-state break-up. Without the big lenders it never had a chance. Its equitable-proportions standard tied debt to assets: the share of debt a successor state might inherit would track the share of the predecessor’s property it received. For former colonies, the Convention’s “newly independent States,” the default ran the other way: no debt of the old colonial power would pass to them at all unless they agreed to take it on.

Russia’s deal

When it dissolved, the Soviet Union owed foreign creditors approximately $66–70 billion, though broader definitions of what counted as Soviet debt push the figure toward $100 billion. In December 1991 the republics agreed a formula for splitting both the debt and the foreign assets: Russia took about 61%, Ukraine about 16%, and the remaining republics shared the rest.

By mid-1992 the arrangement had collapsed, and only Russia was making payments. The other republics were in economic freefall and couldn’t service the debts the formula had assigned them.

Russia’s proposal was called the “zero option.” Russia would assume all external Soviet debt, not just its allocated share, in exchange for all Soviet foreign assets: embassies, bank accounts, gold reserves, claims on third countries. Its status as the legal “continuator” of the USSR, rather than one successor among many, was already in place. On December 24, 1991, with the backing of the other CIS states, Boris Yeltsin told the UN Secretary-General that Russia was continuing the Soviet Union’s membership, Security Council seat included. Continuity and succession are different legal statuses. A successor state inherits some elements of a predecessor’s legal personality, picking up certain obligations and certain memberships. A continuator is the predecessor, uninterrupted, for the purposes of treaties, institutional positions and international standing: the difference between inheriting a seat at the table and being the person who was already sitting there. The zero option, adopted at a CIS summit in Bishkek on October 9, 1992, brought the money into line with that continuity.

Western creditors and the Paris Club got something they badly wanted: a single counterparty instead of twelve fractured ones, even if that counterparty needed Paris Club reschedulings every year from 1992 to 1996 and went through a financial crisis in 1998. The smaller republics got relief from debts they couldn’t service in exchange for assets they couldn’t access anyway: Soviet embassies abroad and bank accounts they had no mechanism to claim. Ukraine alone never ratified the swap, and still claims its share of Soviet property abroad. In August 2006, on the back of high oil and gas prices, Russia paid off its remaining Paris Club debt years ahead of schedule: about $23.7 billion, the largest prepayment the Club had ever received. The last Soviet-era obligation, that payment to Bosnia, cleared in August 2017.

None of this was dictated by law. The only codified rule sits in the 1983 Convention, which never entered into force, and it lets successor states split the debt however they agree among themselves; the customary rules that frame such talks supply principles, not a formula.

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Nothing required Russia to become the continuator, made the zero option the correct resolution, or obliged Western powers to recognize one continuator rather than five, ten, or twelve separate successor states. The debt deal was built to fit a status settled politically ten months earlier, by parties whose interests had aligned around a creditor-friendly outcome.

Yugoslavia, with no Russia

Yugoslavia’s dissolution produced no obvious continuator. Five successor states: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro, which went their separate ways in 2006), Slovenia, and Macedonia (today North Macedonia). None was large enough to absorb the whole thing, and none had the leverage to demand continuator status on terms Western powers would find convenient.

On December 14, 1992, the IMF Executive Board declared Yugoslavia dissolved and designated all five states as equal successors. Loans that had financed projects in a specific republic, about three-quarters of the total, stayed with that republic. Debt that could not be traced to a particular republic was split by the “IMF key,” a formula built mainly on each republic’s contribution to the federal budget, its share of social product and export earnings, and its share of population and territory. Serbia and Montenegro, as the FRY, took the largest share of that debt, about 37%, and Macedonia the smallest, about 5%. The result was five economically damaged states, several of them at war, each a separate debtor negotiating on its own.

The failed continuator claim

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) initially asserted the same legal status Russia had claimed: legal continuator of the SFRY rather than merely a successor state, entitled to full inheritance of the predecessor's international position and assets. The international community rejected the claim. Russia had made the identical move a few months earlier and succeeded, because it was the obvious single candidate and because Western powers found continuity convenient, particularly regarding the nuclear arsenal and the Security Council seat. The FRY's claim failed because the wars of Yugoslav succession had made Belgrade a pariah. The same legal maneuver produced opposite results within a year, and what decided between them was largely whether major powers found the claim politically acceptable.

At the end of 1991 the former SFRY owed Paris Club governments about $4.15 billion. There was no multilateral settlement. The Club dealt with each successor state separately: a coordinated creditor bloc facing five individual debtors, each with its own leverage, economic conditions and political relationships with the creditor nations. In agreements finalized after 2001, the FRY’s Paris Club debt was reduced by about $3 billion. The Agreement on Succession Issues of the Former SFRY was signed in June 2001 and entered into force in June 2004, more than a decade after the state ceased to exist.

The breakup left five separate debtors at five separate negotiating tables facing a single coordinated creditor bloc. Croatia negotiating alone in 1995 was not in the same position as Croatia negotiating alongside Slovenia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and the FRY. The Paris Club works through bilateral arrangements, one debtor at a time, and once the five states had been designated successors and handed their shares, that is how each of them came to the table.

Through all of it, from the allocations and the separate negotiations to the decade-long succession agreement, the only “benefit” question anyone formally asked was geographic: which republic a loan had financed, not whether it had served the people now expected to pay it.

South Sudan and the zero option without assets

The zero option produces different outcomes at opposite ends of the power spectrum. At the weaker end, it keeps debt obligations alive after they have been severed from any realistic capacity to service them.

South Sudan became independent in July 2011, after a January referendum in which nearly 99% of voters chose independence. Under the “zero option,” agreed in principle before secession and written into the Addis Ababa agreements of September 27, 2012, Sudan kept all of the old state’s external debt, some $41–44 billion. The condition: South Sudan would join Sudan in lobbying for debt relief, and if the international community had not firmly committed to that relief within two years, the debt would be divided between the two countries instead.

With the South gone, Sudan had lost some three-quarters of its oil production, half of its fiscal revenues, and about two-thirds of its foreign-exchange earnings. The country that lost its main revenue source kept the whole debt. The country that inherited the oil paid compensation instead, a $3.028 billion “transitional financial arrangement” plus pipeline fees: a fraction of a debt stock more than ten times larger.

The two-year window closed in September 2014 without firm commitments of relief. Instead of splitting the debt, the two countries agreed to extend the deadline to October 2016, and the split never came: the debt stayed with Khartoum. Sudan had been in arrears to the IMF since 1984; those arrears, together with broad US economic sanctions, lifted only in October 2017, shut it out of most outside financing and kept the Fund’s role to monitoring, with no new money until the arrears were cleared in 2021. Much of the debt was owed to fellow Arab governments rather than the West: by 2010, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia alone held more than a quarter of it. The relief that was supposed to be Sudan’s reward for shouldering the whole debt arrived years late, and only in part, after Bashir fell. Sudan reached the HIPC “decision point” in June 2021, and in July the Paris Club agreed to cancel $14.1 billion of its claims. The October 2021 coup halted the bilateral deals needed to put that cancellation into effect, and the war that broke out in April 2023 froze the process short of the finish line.

The oil transit problem

South Sudan, landlocked, had to ship oil through Sudan's pipeline and port infrastructure. Oil and debt were settled in the same package, the Cooperation Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on September 27, 2012. The link between the two was acknowledged, but lopsided: a one-off cushion worth a few billion dollars on one side, a debt of more than $40 billion on the other, and a hope of outside relief that nobody at the table could deliver.

Russia traded assets it held for liabilities it could eventually carry. It took a decade of reschedulings and a 1998 crash, but oil revenues, a foreign property portfolio and its institutional weight made the arithmetic work in the end. Sudan traded revenues it no longer controlled for a debt it could not pay, in exchange for relief that arrived nearly a decade late and then stalled. Both deals went by the name of the zero option, and for creditors they delivered the same thing: a named obligor with formal legal responsibility for the debt.

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The doctrine that keeps losing

One legal argument was built for populations saddled with debts like these, and it has never achieved binding legal recognition.

Alexander Nahum Sack was a Russian lawyer who taught in Saint Petersburg and later Paris. In his 1927 treatise, Les Effets des Transformations des États sur leurs Dettes Publiques et autres Obligations Financières, he formalized what became known as the odious debt doctrine. In English translation, his formulation reads: “If a despotic power incurs a debt not for the needs or in the interest of the State, but to strengthen its despotic regime, to repress the population that fights against it, etc., this debt is odious for the population of all the State. This debt is not an obligation for the nation; it is a regime’s debt, a personal debt of the power that has incurred it, consequently it falls with the fall of this power.” Three conditions: debt contracted without the people’s consent, not for their benefit, and with creditors’ knowledge of those facts.

Sack didn’t invent the principle. He distilled it from what states had already done — and two episodes stand out: Mexico’s repudiation of Emperor Maximilian’s debts in 1867, and the United States’ refusal in 1898 to let Spain’s colonial debt bind Cuba.

The Sack precedents

Mexico in 1867: after the fall of the French-imposed Maximilian regime, President Juárez repudiated debts the Maximilian government had contracted, including loans France had extended to sustain its own puppet, on the grounds that these debts served the regime, not the Mexican people. France protested, but never recovered the money from Mexico. Cuba in 1898: in the negotiations for the Treaty of Paris ending the Spanish-American War, the United States explicitly refused to allow Spain's colonial debts to bind Cuba. The US position was that Cuba had derived no benefit from Spain's colonial borrowing, and its population should not inherit obligations contracted against their interests. Spain assumed the debts. Both were things states actually did, which is why the doctrine's advocates still cite them. Its sceptics answer that a repudiation by whoever holds power does not make a rule of law, and the legal scholars Sarah Ludington and Mitu Gulati argue that the doctrine's pedigree, Sack's own reputation included, has been inflated by the people who rely on it.

The landmark arbitration is the Tinoco case, Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 1923, with Chief Justice William Howard Taft as sole arbitrator. Taft found that debts contracted by the Tinoco regime for the private benefit of the Tinocos, with the lending bank’s full knowledge, could not constitute valid public debt binding Costa Rica. The ruling carries a caveat. Taft’s decision rested on the specific, documented fact of the bank’s knowledge and the debt’s demonstrably personal benefit to the Tinocos. Those specific conditions voided that specific debt. He did not establish that successor states can repudiate a predecessor regime’s debts as odious in general.

Iraq in 2003 shows the doctrine confronting the institution that would need to apply it. At the time of the US invasion, Iraq had approximately $130 billion in external debt, run up during the Iran-Iraq War and the sanctions period by a regime the invading power was calling a criminal dictatorship.

The case for calling it odious looked obvious: a despotic regime, debt not incurred for the population’s benefit, and creditors who had lent to Saddam Hussein knowing what his government was. When Iraq’s newly hired lawyers first sat down with the White House, the Treasury and the IMF in 2004, the main subject on the table was whether Iraq’s debt could be declared odious. The idea had backing at the top of the US administration, and Treasury Secretary John Snow floated it in public.

The IMF publicly rejected the idea, and the institutions that normally run restructurings pushed for a standard deal instead; they got one. Under the November 2004 Paris Club agreement, Iraq’s Paris Club debt was cut by 80% at face value and by nearly 90% in net present value terms, far deeper than the 13–73% haircuts of other restructurings of the period. Iraq kept the right to challenge individual claims as odious, and used it against a handful of commercial lenders, but the broad argument was shelved. The economic historian Simon Hinrichsen reads the outcome bluntly: creditors most likely accepted the bigger haircut to keep the odious debt doctrine out of international law.

Every major creditor nation has at some point lent to dictators. Mobutu’s Zaire piled up more than $12 billion in foreign debt while public money flowed into his private accounts; Marcos borrowed heavily right up to his fall in 1986; apartheid South Africa borrowed from Western banks through the 1980s while pouring its budget into the military and police. Iraq’s own debt was built up largely by governments backing Baghdad in the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf monarchies above all, alongside Western and Soviet-bloc lenders. A working doctrine that made such loans uncollectable from successor democratic regimes would have put a large share of sovereign lending at risk, reaching back to every debt a successor government might think to contest, Iraq’s included. The legal advisors advocated against it; the IMF and Treasury strongly supported standard restructuring. They opposed the doctrine without disputing that Iraq’s debt was odious: it would complicate the restructuring (a “minefield of definitions,” in Hinrichsen’s account) and, by implication, every future restructuring where the question might be raised.

Ecuador in 2008 tells the other version of this story. Rafael Correa’s government launched a debt audit commission in July 2007. Its November 2008 report found documented irregularities across debt contracted from 1976 to 2006 and branded Ecuador’s 2012 and 2030 global bonds, about $3.2 billion, illegitimate. Ecuador stopped paying them, then bought them back at about 35 cents on the dollar, with over 90% creditor participation.

The government used the moral force of the odious debt argument as leverage in a settlement negotiation and never tested the doctrine in any forum that might produce precedent. Ecuador settled before the doctrine could be adjudicated, and the law professor Adam Feibelman has questioned whether the bonds would have qualified as odious in the first place. When it was over, the precedential strength of odious debt was still only theoretical, as it had been when Ecuador began.

The architecture

The Vienna Convention and the Paris Club belong in the same frame. One is a multilateral treaty designed to introduce equity into sovereign debt succession — by default it would have required equitable apportionment, protected newly independent states, and tied debt inheritance to asset inheritance. The other is an informal grouping of 22 creditor nations, administered from the French Treasury, operating without any formal international legal charter or binding multilateral mandate.

The major creditors that stayed out of the Vienna Convention, the United States, Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom, are all Paris Club members, and they run the older, informal forum where governments’ claims on troubled and successor states actually get renegotiated. No coordination is needed to explain this: a forum that meets debtors one at a time and decides by consensus among lenders gives each of them more control than a treaty’s equity rules would have.

Since its first meeting in 1956, the Paris Club has reached 484 agreements covering about $616 billion of debt. It sets the norms for sovereign debt restructuring through practice, with no treaty, democratic mandate or legal standard behind it beyond the rules its members enforce on each other by consensus. Any single major creditor can block any norm that threatens its interests. Nothing in the Paris Club’s rulebook asks whether a debt was odious; its six founding principles cover solidarity, consensus, conditionality and fair burden-sharing among creditors, not the legitimacy of the loans. To get to the table, a debtor needs an active IMF program, and the IMF is governed by weighted voting that reflects the capital contributions of its major shareholders, who are the same major creditor nations.

The legal vocabulary in this domain (“equitable apportionment,” “zero option,” “odious debt,” “continuator state”) sets loose outer limits and gives each settlement its name; bargaining among governments and creditors fills in the rest. Yugoslavia’s untraceable debts were apportioned by an IMF formula that left five separate debtors, and no principle of equity demanded that particular split. Nor did any legal principle require Sudan, the revenue-losing state, to bear the liability. The debt stayed there because the two governments agreed it would, on a condition of outside relief that was not met in time, and then extended the arrangement rather than divide the debt.

In practice, the working rules of sovereign debt succession are creditor rules. They are set mostly in creditor forums and administered by creditor-controlled institutions, which have kept the odious debt doctrine out of them even when, as in Iraq, that meant swallowing an unusually deep haircut. The doctrine lives in legal scholarship, where it is cited and admired but remains inapplicable.

The last payment

When Russia’s $125.2 million reached Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2017, one dissolved state’s continuator was paying a successor of another under terms set in the early 1990s, in rooms the debtor populations never entered, many of them inside a creditor club with no legal mandate beyond the norms its members enforce on each other.

In 1927 Alexander Sack took a principle states had already applied, in Mexico and Cuba among other places, and formalized it as a legal doctrine. By its logic, loans that met his test, such as credit that lenders knowingly extended to keep Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship going, should have fallen with the regime that took them.

For nearly a century, his framework has collected citations, the odd tactical victory, and nothing more binding than that, because the institutions that would need to apply it are the same institutions it was designed to constrain.

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Cite this article
Lena Martin. “What happens to a country’s debt when it ceases to exist.” Eikleaf, 18 May 2026, updated 2 November 2026. https://www.eikleaf.com/what-happens-to-a-countrys-debt-when-it-ceases-to-exist/

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Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (National Bank), 10 dinara (1920). The obverse allegory of “Progress” was engraved by Robert Savage. – Wikipedia

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