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Last updated: · 15 min read

In brief
In 2020, American diplomats fanned out across Asia to warn governments about a cable from Marseille to Singapore. The lowest bid came from a firm formerly called Huawei Marine Networks; Washington warned of possible sanctions, and a pricier American firm won. Censorship is the wrong story. The internet is splitting over who owns the cables, runs its address book and writes its technical standards. Russia has already built an internet that can keep running cut off from the world. The standards for the network of 2035 are being written now, and hardware built to them is slow to change.

In 2020, American diplomats fanned out across Asia to warn governments about a fiber-optic cable.

SEA-ME-WE 6 is some 21,700 kilometers of undersea cable, counting its branches, running from Marseille to Singapore across the Indian Ocean, touching shore in more than a dozen countries that together hold more than a quarter of the world’s population. The lowest bid came from HMN Technologies, formerly Huawei Marine Networks, which Huawei had sold to the Chinese firm Hengtong Optic-Electric in a deal agreed in 2019. By most measures, HMN was going to win. Then the State Department got involved. American embassies warned consortium members that if they accepted HMN’s contract they would face consequences, possibly including sanctions. In February 2021, the bidding was reopened. SubCom of New Jersey, whose bid came in higher, won the contract. Washington had used ambassadors, formal warnings and the threat of financial punishment, all over who would lay fiber-optic cable on the ocean floor.

The usual explanation for a fight like this is surveillance: Chinese equipment in critical infrastructure could give Chinese intelligence a way in. That is part of it. The larger stake is who controls the physical and logical architecture that makes global internet connectivity possible at all, and what happens to that architecture when the countries building it no longer share the same model of what the internet is for.

The wrong story

China’s apparatus for content control, the Great Firewall, is extensive and well documented: DNS poisoning answers queries for blocked domains with forged, dead-end addresses; IP blocking prevents direct connection to foreign servers; deep packet inspection scans traffic for keywords and disrupts connections that carry them. Hundreds of millions of people in China cannot reach Google, Facebook, or the New York Times without a VPN, and the VPNs work until the government decides they don’t.

But the Great Firewall works on traffic as it passes: it forges answers, drops connections and filters content. Effective as it is, it leaves untouched the questions of who controls routing infrastructure, who maintains the naming systems that make every addressable destination findable, who sets the technical standards that determine what equipment can connect to what, who owns the cables that carry traffic between continents.

The internet most people experience, made of web pages, apps, streaming video and email, rides on a stack of infrastructure they never see. Censorship decides what people can reach through that stack. Whether the internet stays a single system or splits into two depends on who builds and governs the stack itself.

Two models, one address book

Since 1998 the internet’s naming and numbering system has been governed by ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. This is the infrastructure that coordinates domain names, IP address blocks and the registries of protocol parameters. ICANN, a California nonprofit, was set up in partnership with the US Department of Commerce, which contracted it to run the IANA functions: the technical operations that maintain the root zone of the domain name system. The department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) held oversight authority over those functions. This arrangement was always meant to be temporary, and while it lasted, the technical operations at the center of a global network sat under one government’s oversight.

The competing model runs through the ITU, the International Telecommunication Union, a UN agency founded in 1865 to coordinate telegraph infrastructure among sovereign states. The governments that press their case through it hold that internet governance belongs to states, not corporations or “multistakeholder communities,” and that each nation has legitimate authority over the internet infrastructure within its borders. The model speaks of sovereignty, and in practice it hands governments control of the networks inside their borders.

The conflict broke into the open in December 2012, in Dubai. At the World Conference on International Telecommunications, a bloc of countries including Russia, China, the UAE and Saudi Arabia pushed revisions to the International Telecommunication Regulations that would have given governments far greater authority over the internet, including its naming, numbering and addressing. The most sweeping proposal was withdrawn, and internet language survived only in a non-binding resolution, yet that was enough to split the conference. The revised treaty was signed by 89 states. Fifty-five, including the United States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, refused to sign, and the split has not healed.

The sovereignty bloc had a real grievance and used it strategically. NTIA’s oversight of ICANN meant, structurally, that the US government held a backstop position over the internet’s address book. Then, in 2013, Snowden’s revelations showed the NSA exploiting a different American advantage: the fact that so much of the world’s data passes through US companies and US-connected cables. Technically the two had nothing to do with each other; politically they fused into a single charge that the internet was an American instrument. The grievance was legitimate, yet it was a complaint about American surveillance; it did not show that states should control their own internet infrastructure, which is the conclusion the bloc drew.

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The Snowden factor

When PRISM was revealed in June 2013, the US-led multistakeholder model lost significant credibility with swing states. The NSA had access to data flowing through American internet companies, the same infrastructure the multistakeholder model had entrusted to American firms. Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff made it explicit at the UN General Assembly that September: the US had exploited its structural position for mass surveillance. The strongest argument for state sovereignty over the internet came from US government conduct.

The legitimate part of that complaint was addressed in October 2016, when the NTIA contract with ICANN expired and was not renewed. After a two-year multistakeholder process, the IANA functions passed to a community-steered body, and US government backstop authority over the internet’s address book formally ended. The campaign went on. Russia and China kept pressing at ITU plenipotentiary conferences in 2014 and 2018, and in 2022 Russia ran a candidate for ITU Secretary-General and lost to the US-backed Doreen Bogdan-Martin by 139 votes to 25. Washington won that round, yet the same year a task force convened by the Council on Foreign Relations, the American foreign-policy think tank, concluded that the era of the global internet was over.

Once the IANA transition answered the complaint about American oversight, what remained of the sovereignty case was state authority over information infrastructure, which in practice means the ability to monitor, filter and cut flows of information to citizens.

Who owns the ocean floor

By most estimates more than 99 percent of intercontinental internet traffic travels through submarine cables. As of 2026 there are more than 600 active and planned systems; satellites carry only a sliver. The cables are typically about as thick as a garden hose for most of their ocean crossing, lying directly on the deep-sea floor, with extra layers of armor near shore. They stay mostly invisible until they break or until someone threatens to sanction the companies that build them.

HMN Technologies entered submarine cable construction as Huawei Marine Networks around 2008 and built up meaningful market share on the strength of competitive pricing and technical competence. Then the US government started treating cable contracts as a front in the broader technology competition with China. SEA-ME-WE 6 was the sharpest example, but not the only one. US intervention touched at least six cable projects across the Asia-Pacific over four years. The method was consistent: US officials warned consortium members of consequences and waited for them to reconsider.

The effect on routing is physical and lasting. In Southeast Asia, China’s claims in the South China Sea, known as the Nine-Dash Line, and Beijing’s insistence on approving cable work even outside its recognized territorial waters have delayed the SJC2 cable by several years. They have also prompted the rerouting of at least two cable systems, Apricot and Echo, around Indonesia rather than through the South China Sea. Avoidance has a price: longer routes, slower permits and costlier builds.

Surveillance is part of the physical infrastructure question. Any party with access to a cable, whether at the cable itself or at the onshore landing station where it comes ashore, can intercept traffic. A small number of cities and countries host the majority of landing stations; whoever controls those onshore chokepoints decides who gets to tap them. Britain’s GCHQ, working with the NSA, did exactly that at UK landing stations.

But cable ownership also determines routing, latency and cost, so security and economics don’t separate cleanly. When the US removes a Chinese vendor from a cable consortium, it makes a security decision and a commercial one at once, and the cable that results carries that choice for as long as it runs.

In August 2025, the FCC formalized this logic. It adopted rules establishing a presumption of denial for cable-landing license applications from entities controlled by designated foreign adversaries, and required every applicant to certify that its cable will use no equipment or services from the FCC’s Covered List, Washington’s blacklist of telecom gear and services judged an unacceptable national-security risk. Licensees must also certify that they have cybersecurity and physical-security risk-management plans in place. The rules target the cables themselves, which carry nearly all the data reaching the United States from other continents.

Cable interception: a history

On August 5, 1914, one day after Britain declared war on Germany, the British cable ship Alert cut the submarine telegraph cables linking Germany to the United States. Germany was forced onto radio and onto other countries' cables, traffic Britain could intercept. During the Cold War, the US Navy's Operation IVY BELLS tapped Soviet undersea cables in the Sea of Okhotsk, recording communications that were retrieved by submarine divers. The GCHQ/NSA TEMPORA program, revealed by Snowden in 2013, involved no hacking: it systematically tapped fiber-optic cables at UK landing stations, with the cooperation of the companies that operated them.

The address book fracture

A cable determines whether data can travel. The Domain Name System determines whether it can be found. DNS is the address book of the internet: type a domain name, and DNS resolves it to an IP address. That resolution process begins with the root servers, which sit at the top of the hierarchy and point resolvers toward the right top-level domain. There are 13 named server identities, run by 12 operators (nine American, two European, one Japanese) and copied to more than 2,000 sites around the world.

Russia has decided it cannot depend on that hierarchy. Its sovereign-internet law, in force since November 2019, requires deep packet inspection equipment installed at chokepoints under Roskomnadzor control, and establishes a national DNS system capable of resolving Russian domains without referencing international root servers. The result is the architecture of a separable internet, one that can keep running if Russia severs the connection to the global network, and one from which Russia can do the severing.

Russia tested this architecture from June 15 to July 15, 2021, with all major Russian telecoms taking part. Preliminary results reported by the Russian business daily RBC judged the tests successful, including a test of the capability to physically disconnect the Russian internet from the global network. The secrecy of the process limits any independent check of those claims. Less is in doubt about the architecture itself, which the law requires and which is now operational, or about Russia’s intent to use it.

China’s approach differs. Rather than building a separable routing layer, it keeps data at home. China’s Cybersecurity Law, effective 2017, requires critical information infrastructure operators to store personal data and “important data” within China. The legal effect is that significant categories of data about Chinese users and operations can leave China only after passing a government security assessment.

Russia has required since 2015 that personal data of Russian citizens be collected and stored first in databases physically in Russia, with transfers abroad allowed only afterward and under separate rules. The model has spread: by early 2023, 100 data localization measures were in force across 40 countries, and more than two-thirds of them combined local storage requirements with restrictions on cross-border data flows.

Sovereign DNS plus data localization adds up to a separable network architecture, and because it is already legislated, installed and, in Russia’s case, operationally tested, the internet has in significant measure already fractured.

How DNS root zones work

When your computer wants to reach a website, it asks a DNS resolver for the IP address of the domain. That resolver, if it has neither the answer nor the top-level domain's servers cached, queries a root name server, one of 13 root server identities that know which servers are authoritative for each top-level domain. The root zone is maintained by ICANN. Russia's national DNS is built so that, if the country is cut off or cuts itself off, Russian resolvers can keep answering from domestic copies of the root and of the .ru, .su and .рф zones. In that scenario, services whose servers and dependencies sit inside Russia can keep working for users there, anything that relies on servers abroad stops working for them, and from the outside the Russian internet goes dark. A content filter blocks specific websites. This is topological separation: the logical equivalent of two separate internets that use the same underlying protocols but cannot, structurally, find each other.
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Standards, the deepest layer

Cables carry the data and naming systems find addresses, but standards determine what the data is, how it is formatted, what protocols govern its transmission and what equipment can process it at all.

The assumption that technical standards are apolitical is a relic of an era when the organizations that set them were dominated by engineers from a handful of Western countries and Japan. The IETF operates by “rough consensus and running code”: engineer-led, bottom-up, resistant to state capture. The ITU is a treaty body in which member states hold the votes. The two governance models are not equivalent, and in some areas they have produced different standards. The contest over which model sets internet standards is also a contest over who controls the architecture of global communications.

China’s engagement with standards bodies is a decades-long strategic investment with measurable results. In the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Chinese secretariat positions in technical committees and subcommittees grew by more than half between 2011 and 2021. Germany and the United States still hold more secretariats: in 2021 Germany ran 132 ISO secretariats, the US 98 and China 68. But no other major country’s count had grown anywhere near as fast over that decade.

In 3GPP, the body that develops 5G technical specifications, Chinese representatives held more than a third of the chair and vice-chair positions in its technical groups by October 2021, more than any other country, and by December 2021 Chinese voting members outnumbered US members more than two-to-one.

Chairs and vice-chairs in standards bodies control agendas, determine how time is allocated, and shape what proposals get serious consideration and which die of procedural inattention. The chair of a working group can slow-walk proposals they dislike and accelerate ones they support. Standards get made mostly through the institutional work that happens before any vote is called.

In September 2019, Huawei, China Mobile, China Unicom, and China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology submitted a proposal to ITU-T’s Telecommunications Standardization Advisory Group: “New IP,” a wholesale redesign of foundational internet protocols. In October 2020, ICANN’s technical office warned that the proposal’s tight binding of addresses to users could make pervasive monitoring much easier, and that it would turn the internet into a patchwork of separate networks joined by gateways. The Internet Society objected to the very idea of a “top-down design for the future network” drawn up inside an intergovernmental body. The ITU did not advance New IP: in December 2020, the plenaries of ITU-T Study Groups 13 and 11 declined to take it on as new work and shelved discussion until the World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly of March 2022.

Beijing responded by reformulating. Elements of New IP kept resurfacing as fresh proposals in other ITU-T study groups through 2021. Meanwhile Huawei pushed a parallel track, “IPv6 Enhanced” (IPv6+), into other venues: in January 2021 the European Telecommunications Standards Institute launched an industry group on IPv6 Enhanced Innovation, with a Huawei engineer among its vice-chairs.

In October 2021, the CCP Central Committee and State Council issued the National Standardization Development Outline, which sets targets for 2025 and 2035 and links standards-setting to a long list of strategic technology sectors. It tells Chinese companies, industry groups and research institutes to take an active part in international standards organizations, pushes China to help write international standards, aims to make Chinese and international standards compatible, and even encourages international standards organizations to set up in China. It turns a decade of rapid growth in Chinese participation into explicit state policy.

The standards that govern the network of 2035 are being designed in committees meeting now. Whatever gets standardized gets built into the routers, base stations and other networking equipment manufactured to those specifications, and once that equipment is deployed, changing what it can do is slow and expensive.

What two internets cost

The IMF estimated in 2023 that severe geoeconomic fragmentation could reduce global output by up to 7 percent, trillions of dollars a year, with losses of 8 to 12 percent in some countries once technology decoupling is added. Those figures cover fragmentation broadly, including trade restrictions, supply chain disruption and investment barriers, so they describe the scale of a broader rupture, not the cost of a divided internet as such.

The operational costs are already running. In early 2023, all five of Vietnam’s international submarine cables suffered partial or total damage at the same time, cutting 75 percent of the country’s international data flow over the Lunar New Year period. Providers compensated partly by buying extra bandwidth over land cables through China. Three of those five cables failed again in 2024. Repairs can take weeks or months (Vietnam waited three to nine months in 2023), and the failures recur. The outages exposed how little redundancy Vietnam had, and its fallback ran through China, while Washington was pressing Hanoi to keep HMN Technologies out of its new cables.

Data localization produces bills of its own. Mastercard earmarked around $350 million for a local payments-processing center in India to meet the Reserve Bank of India’s 2018 rule that payment-system data be stored in India, with narrow exceptions for cross-border transactions. In 2021 the RBI still barred it from signing up new domestic card customers for falling short.

The highest costs fall on neither the United States nor China, both of which have the population, market size and technical capacity to sustain separate internet ecosystems. The countries between the blocs cannot. Vietnam faces Chinese-linked cable infrastructure and US routing pressure at the same time. Indonesia is a fast-growing data-center hub and cable crossroads courted by both camps. African countries that built connectivity substantially through Huawei equipment and Chinese-financed networks are now under Western pressure to keep Chinese vendors out of their next generation of infrastructure.

A country that built its 5G network with Huawei, routes international traffic through HMN cables, and stores cloud data on Alibaba infrastructure has made a foreign policy commitment whether it intended one or not, and the commitment is built into hardware that is costly to replace.

The cable in the ground

The fracture of the global internet runs through decisions most people never see: in procurement decisions for cables on the ocean floor, in votes on technical committee chairmanships, in legislation requiring data to stay within national borders, in month-long tests of a sovereign Russian internet. Each of these can pass as routine governance. Together they make a network that still works as one easier to pull apart along political lines.

The SEA-ME-WE 6 contract went to SubCom rather than HMN Technologies. The route is the same, from Marseille to Singapore across the Indian Ocean, touching shore in the same countries. Its landings came ashore through 2024 and 2025, and the start of service, first set for 2025, has slipped into 2027. Once the system is switched on the data will flow just as planned, but through cable built, owned and routed under different agreements.

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Ulfur Atli. “The invisible border that splits the Internet in two.” Eikleaf, 9 May 2026, updated 2 November 2026. https://www.eikleaf.com/the-invisible-border-that-splits-the-internet-in-two/

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