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Last updated: · 13 min read

In brief
Russia signed the treaty annexing Crimea on 18 March 2014, and the next day Putin ordered a bridge across the Kerch Strait. A long bridge over contested water is more than infrastructure. It stakes a claim. So Russia rushed to repair the Kerch Bridge after two Ukrainian attacks, even with a land corridor available: leaving it broken would concede the claim. The Øresund link between Denmark and Sweden claims nothing, because whose shore was whose was settled long before. China keeps proposing a Taiwan tunnel as part of a Beijing–Taipei expressway, and the name itself carries the claim.

Russia signed the Treaty of Accession annexing Crimea on 18 March 2014. The next day, 19 March, Vladimir Putin ordered his transport ministry to build a bridge across the Kerch Strait, for both cars and trains. Moscow had in fact already ordered the creation of a company to commission it on 3 March, while its troops were still taking over the peninsula. Three months earlier, Russia and Ukraine had agreed to build a bridge there together; now Moscow would build it alone.

The 24-hour gap between annexation and order says something about what bridges mean when they span contested water, and why a long crossing over such water carries so much weight.

What the bridge is for

The Kerch Strait Bridge, officially the Crimean Bridge, runs 19 kilometers across the strait separating Russia’s Taman Peninsula from the Kerch Peninsula of Crimea. It is the longest bridge in Europe and the longest Russia has ever built, at a cost of more than ₽220 billion, roughly $3.7 billion. The road section opened in May 2018, with Putin personally driving a Kamaz truck across it at the opening ceremony. Rail followed in December 2019.

Road and rail do different jobs. Road capacity is useful for civilian traffic and light logistics. Rail capacity moves armor, artillery, fuel and munitions at formation scale, the kind of movement that road transport cannot replicate efficiently. Building both gave the crossing civilian and military capacity at once.

After February 24, 2022, that capacity went to war. The Kerch Bridge worked as a primary military logistics corridor, with armor moving south into Crimea and supply columns moving north on the rail line.

On October 8, 2022, shortly after 6 a.m., a truck bomb exploded on the road span, and two two-lane vehicular sections collapsed into the strait. The adjacent railway span, structurally separate, survived the road collapse but took fire from tanker cars, and Russian supply lines into southern Ukraine came under new strain. Russia’s emergency response was immediate. Repairs began within days, and by February 2023 Russia had reopened all four road lanes. Then, on July 17, 2023, Ukrainian Sea Baby naval drones struck again, damaging further spans and killing two civilians. In June 2025, a third attack used underwater explosives against the bridge’s submerged supports; the crossing closed briefly and reopened within hours.

Russia rebuilt what the first two attacks broke and denied that the third had done any damage. When a supply line is damaged in war, a military planner weighs alternatives. Russia never treated the bridge as one route among several that it could do without.

The attacks on the Kerch bridge

The October 8, 2022 attack used a truck bomb that Russia's FSB says was hidden in rolls of construction film on 22 pallets, a 22.7-tonne cargo smuggled from Ukraine via Bulgaria, Georgia and Armenia. Five people were killed: the truck driver and four people in a car next to the truck. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) claimed responsibility on July 26, 2023, when its head, Vasyl Malyuk, publicly confirmed that his agency directed the operation.

The second attack came on July 17, 2023. The Ukrainian Navy and the SBU used Sea Baby kamikaze surface drones, each able to carry up to 850 kilograms of explosives, to strike bridge supports. Two of the bridge's four road lanes were rendered unusable and adjacent spans were knocked loose. Two civilians died. In mid-August 2023, Malyuk confirmed the operation on the record, handing CNN the video of the strike.

A third attack followed on June 3, 2025, when the SBU set off underwater explosives against the bridge's submerged supports. The SBU claimed serious damage; the Kremlin said nothing had been damaged. The crossing closed for several hours and reopened the same day.

Russia answered the first two attacks with emergency repairs, accelerated timelines and presidential attention. As a supply route, the bridge was not irreplaceable. After 2022, the land corridor Russia had seized through southern Ukraine, entering Crimea across the Perekop isthmus, offered an alternative. Russia treated the damage as a sovereignty problem, because letting the bridge stay damaged would have meant conceding the claim that built it.

A bridge across contested water connects two shores and stakes a claim to them, so destroying one attacks the claim.

What the water does

There are dozens of bridges across the Thames, and nobody calls them geopolitically significant. The bridges across the Seine, the Rhine and the Danube move people and goods and occasionally cause traffic problems. None of them is a territorial assertion.

The Kerch Strait bridge, ordered the day after an annexation, is a territorial assertion. What sets it apart from the bridges of the Thames is the water it crosses.

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Length alone proves nothing. The longest bridge in the world is a 164-kilometer railway viaduct across the farmland of Jiangsu, and no one has ever fought over what lies beneath it. What a long crossing over water measures is the water, and a strait is where many unsettled frontiers come to rest.

When two parties cannot force a dispute to resolution, when the outcome of a conflict is ambiguous, the sovereignty unclear or the recognition withheld, water provides a natural delimiter that holds the question open without resolving it.

The Kerch Strait itself is only three to four kilometers wide at its narrowest point. The bridge is 19 kilometers long because its builders routed it across Tuzla Island rather than over the much shorter crossing at the Chushka Spit. Its politics turn on who owns the water. Before March 2014, the Kerch Strait was water shared by two sovereign states. The bridge erased that arrangement by treating both shores as Russian.

Nobody has fought over the Thames as a frontier in centuries. The Kerch Strait was different: under the 2003 bilateral treaty between Russia and Ukraine, it was designated as shared internal waters of both states, so neither country held sole sovereignty and crossing it required cooperation. Russia’s bridge put an end to that.

A bridge over such water is meant to be permanent. An annexing power builds one because concrete and steel last longer than political arrangements, and a bridge, once built, imposes physical facts that later governments inherit.

The exception

The Øresund Link runs 16 kilometers across the strait between Copenhagen, Denmark and Malmö, Sweden: a 7.8-kilometer bridge, the artificial island of Peberholm and a 3.5-kilometer tunnel. It opened on July 1, 2000.

Sweden and Denmark are NATO allies, EU members and close trading partners. If any bridge across formerly contested water has become plain infrastructure, it is this one. But the strait it crosses has a long history as a frontier.

At Helsingør, where the strait narrows at its northern end, Hamlet’s castle, Kronborg, sits on a headland commanding the water. On the opposite shore at Helsingborg, now in Sweden, stands the medieval tower of Kärnan. It was built when both shores were Danish, and it looks straight back across four kilometers of water.

For centuries this was the most expensive stretch of water in European maritime trade. The Sound Dues (Øresundstolden) were introduced in 1429 by King Eric of Pomerania.

Almost every merchant ship passing through the Øresund between the North Sea and the Baltic owed Denmark a toll. In the 16th and 17th centuries, those tolls made up as much as two-thirds of the Danish state’s total revenue. Denmark was a country supported by other countries’ need to pass through the water it controlled.

That revenue depended on military control of the strait. Ships anchored under the guns at Helsingør to pay, and the fortresses on both shores were how Denmark enforced the toll.

The Copenhagen Convention of 1857 ended it. Fourteen maritime powers agreed to pay Denmark a one-time sum of about 30.5 million rigsdaler in exchange for the permanent abolition of the Sound Dues. Denmark accepted. The dues were abolished for good, the strait opened toll-free to merchant ships of every flag, and the United States settled by a separate treaty soon after. The buyout removed Denmark’s oldest commercial reason for holding the crossing by force.

The Treaty of Roskilde in 1658 clarifies the stakes. Denmark lost the war of 1657–58 so badly that at Roskilde it ceded Scania and Blekinge to Sweden and gave up Halland for good. That is why the strait today lies between two countries rather than being a Danish lake.

Proposals for a fixed link between the two shores go back to the late 19th century. Formal negotiations between the two governments began in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1973 the two governments even signed a fixed-link agreement, but the Danish parliament never approved it, mainly because the deal was tied to a plan for a new Copenhagen airport on the island of Saltholm, and the project stalled for more than a decade. Only in 1987, once Denmark had settled on its own fixed link across the Great Belt, did Denmark and Sweden agree on a joint plan to investigate a link afresh.

None of these delays was about defense. War between Denmark and Sweden had long been unthinkable, though the two took different paths: Denmark joined NATO in 1949, while Sweden stayed outside military alliances. The two governments reached the bridge agreement in 1991, construction ran from 1995 to 1999, and the link opened in July 2000. Sweden joined the European Union in 1995, and NATO only in March 2024, long after the bridge had begun carrying traffic.

At Øresund, the question of whose shore was whose had been settled long before the engineering began, so when the bridge finally came, its obstacles were airports, budgets and rival projects, and it had no claim to make.

The Sound Dues and the Convention of 1857

For 428 years, ships of nearly every flag transiting the Øresund paid Denmark a toll, though exemptions came and went; Swedish ships, for one, sailed free until 1720. King Eric of Pomerania introduced the dues in 1429 as a revenue mechanism for a king who happened to control the main sea route between the Atlantic economy and the Baltic. Kronborg castle at Helsingør was a royal residence and also the fortress that made the toll collectable.

The 1857 Copenhagen Convention abolished the toll. Fourteen nations signed, and Britain and Russia each paid roughly one-third of the total of about 30.5 million rigsdaler. In economic terms, the payment was a capitalized settlement of future toll liabilities, with shipping nations buying out Denmark's perpetual claim. It was also a collective assertion that the strait belonged to European commerce and not to Denmark's treasury.
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The bridge China keeps proposing

No such settlement exists across the Taiwan Strait, where a tunnel was first proposed in 1996.

The proposed route runs from Pingtan on Fujian’s coast to Hsinchu in northwest Taiwan, a crossing of about 130 kilometers of open water. In 2013, China’s State Council approved a national highway network plan running to 2030 that incorporated the project as part of the G3 Beijing–Taipei Expressway. Cost estimates range from 400 to 500 billion yuan, roughly $60–75 billion at today’s exchange rates.

Taipei’s response has been consistent. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council called the proposal part of Beijing’s “united front propaganda.” The council says Taiwan has never discussed the issue with Beijing and has no intention of collaborating on cross-strait infrastructure.

The strait between Fujian and Taiwan is approximately 130 kilometers wide at the proposed crossing point. Taiwan’s strategic defense capability depends substantially on that barrier. An amphibious invasion of Taiwan requires an extraordinary commitment of naval and air power: the crossing is exposed, the distances punishing, and the logistics of putting a capable landing force on a hostile shore enormous. For Taiwan, the strait is the primary defense.

A working tunnel would put a fixed link under that barrier. Traffic could reach Hsinchu without a ship crossing 130 kilometers of exposed water, and in a crisis the question would no longer be only how to project a fleet, but who controls the tunnel along its length.

Before a single meter of tunnel is bored, each appearance of the Taiwan Strait Tunnel in official Chinese planning documents makes a physical connection between Fujian and Taiwan look like a reasonable thing to plan, and treats the strait as a gap inside one country. The G3 Expressway, after all, runs from Beijing to Taipei, not from Fujian to a foreign country, so the expressway number itself carries the claim.

China has built long sea crossings before. The Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge, opened in October 2018, is a 55-kilometer bridge-and-tunnel crossing of the Pearl River estuary that took nearly a decade to build and was, at its opening, the longest sea crossing in the world. Xi Jinping presided over the ceremony. “I declare the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau bridge officially open,” he said, in a speech that lasted only seconds.

The tunnel to Taiwan would be well over twice as long as that bridge. Hong Kong and Macau are Chinese special administrative regions whose sovereignty is not in dispute. Beijing openly presented the bridge as a way to bind them more tightly to the mainland, but a crossing of the Pearl River estuary claims no one else’s territory. The strait between Fujian and Taiwan is contested water, and a tunnel under it would stake a claim.

The Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge

The HKZMB opened October 24, 2018, after nearly nine years of construction. At 55 kilometers, it combines cable-stayed bridge sections with an immersed tube tunnel running between two artificial islands. Cost: about ¥127 billion (roughly $19 billion), billions of yuan over budget and nearly two years late.

Beijing framed it explicitly as a demonstration of national engineering capacity, proof that China could build what no one else had built.

The analogy to a Taiwan tunnel has clear limits. The bridge shows China can manage a long marine project, but its tunnel runs only 6.7 kilometers, a small fraction of the roughly 130 kilometers a Taiwan tunnel would need. Politically it breaks down because the Pearl River estuary is not contested water, Macau's status was settled in 1999, and no one disputes Chinese sovereignty over Zhuhai.

The crossing that keeps being proposed

The Bering Strait is about 85 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, between Cape Dezhnev on Russia’s Chukotka Peninsula and Cape Prince of Wales in Alaska. In the middle of that crossing sit two small islands: Little Diomede, American, and Big Diomede, Russian, 3.8 kilometers apart. The International Date Line runs between them, so the two islands sit a day apart.

A fixed crossing between the two countries has been proposed again and again. It has never gone further than a proposal.

In the first years of the 20th century, the French promoter Loïc de Lobel and his investors pitched a trans-Siberian-Alaskan railroad with a tunnel under the strait. In 1905, Tsar Nicholas II gave the idea his approval in principle. The tunnel was technically conceivable, but his officials balked at handing Siberia’s mineral wealth to foreign capital, and by 1907 the scheme was dead.

In April 2007, Russian officials presented TKM-World Link: a $65 billion transport corridor built around a 103-kilometer tunnel under the strait, linking the two rail networks and carrying energy to North America. Russian Railways was already planning a 3,500-kilometer line from Yakutia to Uelen on the strait. The idea keeps coming back: in June 2026, Kirill Dmitriev, head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, announced that Russia would sign an agreement to continue designing a tunnel, eight months after he had pitched Elon Musk’s Boring Company as the builder. Nothing has been built, and Washington has signed up to nothing. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has all but ended any near-term prospect of a US-Russia infrastructure collaboration.

Major Ryan Tice of the U.S. Marine Corps described the Bering Strait as an emerging arena of great power competition, a melting maritime corridor that Russia and China are eager to use, and urged a dedicated joint command for Alaska. A fixed crossing would sharpen every one of those concerns.

The worry is strategic: a fixed crossing would give Russia a land route to North America. Since the Cold War, the Bering Strait has been understood as part of the geographic separation that underpins American strategic depth, and a tunnel across it would amount to renegotiating that separation.

Between rivals on the scale of Russia and the United States, a proposal to bridge their shared maritime boundary immediately turns into questions about the whole relationship: Arctic sovereignty, military access, energy dependency.

The Bering crossing is not technically impossible. It would be enormously expensive, and neither shore yet has the thousands of kilometers of railway needed to feed it. But even a funded, connected tunnel would need two states that agree on what they would be building, and until they can, the strait between them will remain uncrossed.

The Kerch Bridge has been struck three times, in October 2022, July 2023 and June 2025, and in mid-2026 it is still carrying traffic, shutting down whenever drones and missiles fill the sky over Kerch.

Ukraine’s strikes hit Russian supply lines and also the physical form of Russia’s claim to have absorbed a piece of Ukrainian territory into itself permanently. Russia’s response, with emergency repairs, presidential theater, continued military use and furious official statements, confirmed that reading.

Part of this war is being fought with and about a bridge that Russia, from the first order for it on March 3, 2014, built as a claim on territory.

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Cite this article
Owen Parker. “Why bridges get more political the longer they are.” Eikleaf, 18 May 2026, updated 2 November 2026. https://www.eikleaf.com/why-bridges-get-more-political-the-longer-they-are/

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Øresund Bridge viewed from a plane taking off from Copenhagen Airport – Wikipedia

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