Last updated: · 14 min read
In brief
In 2010, Rakuten’s Hiroshi Mikitani told his Japanese staff that everything, down to cafeteria menus, would switch to English. English did not win on merit: Esperanto is easier to learn, yet after more than 135 years it has at most two million speakers. A language is worth the network it connects you to. English was written into commercial law, science, aviation and global finance while those systems were still new. That is hard to undo. Every parent who pays for English-medium school makes the network a little larger.
Contents
On March 1, 2010, Hiroshi Mikitani told Rakuten’s employees, over a video link to a company-wide meeting, that the company was switching to English, and not only for international communications or correspondence with overseas partners. Internal meetings, lunchroom signs, the cafeteria menus and emails to the colleague sitting three desks away would all be in English.
Employees had two years to reach their assigned TOEIC targets, set between 600 and 800 points, and those who fell short faced demotion.
These were professionals conducting ordinary working lives in their own country, in their own city, in a company built by and for a Japanese market, and no Anglo-American ownership structure was pressing the mandate down from above; Mikitani chose it himself. The average TOEIC score among Rakuten staff in October 2010 was 526. Closing that gap meant changing how employees spoke and wrote to one another every working day. By May 2015, the average had passed 800.
Why a Japanese company would want to do business in English has an obvious answer. What needs explaining is the pull that makes retraining thousands of professionals in a second language look cheaper than operating outside the English network: where that pull came from, and why, after the empire that built it dissolved, the arithmetic still gave the same answer in Tokyo in 2010 that it gave in Calcutta in 1840.
The merit trap
The most persistent explanation for English’s global dominance is also the least defensible: that English won because it deserved to. The argument takes various forms: that English is unusually precise and expressive, that it is hospitable to new vocabulary, that its stripped-down grammar makes it accessible. The evidence supports none of these claims.
Ludwig Lazarus Zamenhof published Esperanto in Warsaw in 1887, and by every criterion he identified (regularity, learnability, phonetic consistency, grammatical economy) Esperanto outperforms English. It has no irregular verbs, its spelling is perfectly phonetic, and its grammar is compact and regular. After more than 135 years of active advocacy, estimates of its speakers run from around 100,000 to two million, and the number who speak it fluently sits toward the bottom of that range. Zamenhof thought rational actors would adopt the most efficient communication technology.
The Esperanto problem
A language has value in proportion to the network it connects you to, and design counts for little against that. In 1887, English’s network included British imperial commerce, Indian civil service examinations, and American industrial contracts. Esperanto’s network was, and remained, only other Esperanto speakers.
Latin had shown the same thing long before. It dominated European intellectual life for roughly fifteen centuries, though it was not a particularly clear language. The institutional infrastructure that mattered was organised in Latin: the Church ran in Latin, and so did the universities. When those institutions shifted, the language shifted with them. The Protestant Reformation carried scripture into vernacular languages, the printing press made national-language texts economically viable, and nascent national scientific academies published in the languages of their funders.
Before the First World War, German led natural science. In physics, chemistry and pharmacology, many of the journals that mattered published in German, and a scientist who couldn’t read German couldn’t follow the field. The First World War broke that dominance. From 1919, the new International Research Council shut German and Austrian scientists out of the international scientific unions it created. The exclusion punished them for the war and for the German professors’ 1914 manifesto defending it, and the new bodies worked only in French and English. The boycott was lifted in 1926, but German never recovered its old position. The new international bodies took shape while German-speaking scientists were locked out of them, and when science reorganised again after 1945, it did so around English.
The East India Company’s language policy
In British India the mechanism shows up in specific contracts and specific resource allocations. By the early nineteenth century, the East India Company’s operational logic was commercial.
The Company had reorganised large portions of Indian economic life around contracts and courts it controlled. To participate in this commerce as a merchant, clerk, lawyer or intermediary, you increasingly needed English. What pushed people toward it was the legal infrastructure that decided whether your contract was enforceable, which was being rebuilt around English. The Company had inherited Persian as its court language; after Act XXIX of 1837 let the government drop Persian, local languages took over the lower courts and English steadily rose to the top of the system. A merchant who could not follow the language of the court that would hear his disputes had to rely on interpreters and lawyers to defend his own contracts.
Macaulay’s Minute of February 2, 1835, made this logic explicit and extended it. Macaulay proposed redirecting the East India Company’s educational budget away from Arabic and Sanskrit institutions and toward English-medium education. His contempt for Sanskrit and Arabic learning was total and explicit — he declared that “a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia.” But the sharpest part of his case was a market signal: the Company had to pay stipends to its Sanskrit and Arabic students, while Indians were willing to pay to learn English. He proposed stopping the printing of Arabic and Sanskrit books, abolishing the Madrassa and the Sanskrit College in Calcutta, keeping the colleges at Benares and Delhi but paying no stipends to new students, and redirecting the freed funds into English-medium schooling. Governor-General William Bentinck’s resolution of March 7, 1835, stopped short of the closures: the colleges of native learning would stay open while students still came. But new students would get no stipends, spending on printing Oriental works stopped, and the money went to teaching English literature and science.
The consequences did not dissolve with the British Raj. A parent in Mumbai in 2026 who pays a premium for English-medium schooling over Marathi-medium schooling is responding to an employment market that still prices English-medium education higher. The incentive Macaulay argued for is still at work 190 years later, long after the administration that created it.
The embedding repeated across the port cities of British imperial commerce. In Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Singapore, and Hong Kong, English-language contracts, courts, and accounting standards became the operating conditions of commerce. In Lagos, Nairobi, and Accra, English common law and English commercial codes became the legal infrastructure of the extractive economy. Once economic access had run through English for long enough, it no longer needed an empire behind it, because every participant in the system had already priced the language into their human capital.
Persian and the Mughal precedent
Persian was the Mughal administrative lingua franca for the same structural reason English became the British one: it was the language of the courts, the contracts, and the bureaucracy that organised economic and political life. When the East India Company displaced Mughal administration, Persian’s institutional base collapsed within decades, despite centuries of literary and bureaucratic tradition. The precedent shows that English had no special cultural immunity. English won in India for the same reason Persian had won under the Mughals — and Persian’s fate shows what happens to a language when the institutions that require it disappear.
1944 and the language of the world’s new infrastructure
The British Empire dissolved across the postwar decades, but the incentive structures it had built survived. That continuity alone doesn’t fully explain what English became in the second half of the twentieth century, and the rest of the explanation begins in 1944.
Before the Second World War, international science was multilingual. German still held prestige in chemistry and physics. French carried weight in mathematics. Scientists working at the highest level needed multiple languages, and the journals that mattered were spread across them.
After 1945, American scientific capacity underwent an unprecedented expansion. The National Science Foundation was established in 1950, and the Cold War research complex poured federal money into American universities on a scale that had no international equivalent. American institutions became the career destination of the world’s most capable graduate students, and American journals became the publication venues that determined whether a scientific career advanced. Scientists published in English because English was the language of the journals with the citation networks that made careers. As in Company India, careers ran through the language, and the language gained value it had not earned on its merits.
Two institutional decisions in 1944 set the pattern. In July, forty-four Allied nations gathered at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, and produced the agreements that created the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
Both operated in English from the start, and for decades a government seeking international credit dealt with them, in their language. As the dollar became the world’s reserve currency, the language of the institutions built around it became the working language of international finance.
In December, fifty-two states signed the Chicago Convention, establishing the International Civil Aviation Organization. American and British aviation infrastructure dominated the postwar world, and English was the convention’s dominant working language. ICAO’s 1951 recommendation formalised English for international aeronautical radiotelephony, and binding proficiency requirements, adopted in 2003, took effect in March 2008. Aviation chose English because the institution setting the standards was, from its foundation, one where Anglophone powers had primary influence.
By the 1980s, English was simultaneously the language of global science, aviation, international finance, and the dominant commercial legal standard across former British territories. No one chose this in a coordinated way. Each system independently embedded the same language at its founding, and each embedding raised the cost of not speaking English for everyone operating in that system.
The Grin calculation
François Grin, an economist at the University of Geneva, estimated in 2005 that the United Kingdom gains at least €10 billion a year, net, from the dominance of English. The gain comes through privileged markets for English-language teaching and publishing, savings on translation and communication, and the foreign-language education it does not have to fund. Counting multiplier effects and the return on the money saved, Grin put the total at €17–18 billion a year, roughly 1% of British GDP. English dominance amounts to an ongoing transfer from non-English-speaking countries to Anglophone ones. The effort of everyone who must acquire the language adds to the value held by those who already own it.
The self-reinforcing loop
Coordination logic keeps English in place. The value of speaking a language is proportional to the number of people you can reach who also speak it. Each new speaker raises the value for every existing speaker. Linguistic coordination is also total: you cannot run two conversations simultaneously the way you run two software platforms on one machine. So once a language achieves critical mass in a domain, the cost of not speaking it exceeds the cost of learning it for every rational actor in that domain. The equilibrium is self-reinforcing: the larger the network, the higher the cost of opting out, which means more people opt in, which makes the network larger.
Where English still sets people apart, it pays. Among Indian men in 2005, fluent English came with hourly wages about 34% higher, and speaking a little English with wages 13% higher. The return to fluent English was as large as the return to completing secondary school.
In Poland in the early 2010s, where English was already common, advanced command of it came with a wage premium of roughly 11%, against 32% for Spanish and 22% for French. The likeliest reason is scarcity: the more workers who have English, the less it sets any one of them apart. At a certain level of diffusion, English drifts from differentiator toward baseline: not having it closes off access to the largest total opportunity set in the world, while having it earns a smaller edge than a scarcer language would.
The “language of last resort” mechanism compounds this. When a Korean businessperson meets a Brazilian counterpart, they conduct the transaction in English. Neither is comfortable in it or chose it deliberately, and no English-speaking country is involved. English accumulates value from that bilateral interaction, as it does from billions like it.
Rakuten’s decision in 2010 wasn’t isolated. Sodexo in France, Nordea in Finland, and Cemex in Mexico have all designated English as their internal corporate working language. They adopted English because it reduces coordination costs across internationally dispersed workforces. The language works like a common technical standard, valuable chiefly because everybody’s systems already speak it.
Other dominant standards have been displaced. English resists because linguistic switching costs are categorically different from technology switching costs.
When a software platform gets displaced, the switching costs are concentrated. A user migrates data and learns a new interface. The costs are real, but they’re located in individual decisions that can be made sequentially. Linguistic switching costs are distributed across the educational infrastructure of entire countries (teacher training, curricula, textbooks, examination systems), the professional accreditation systems of every high-status occupation, and the accumulated career capital of hundreds of millions of professionals. These are independent institutional systems with independent governance. Displacing English broadly would mean moving many of them within a short span, and any system that moves alone pays the cost of leaving the others behind. Coordinated defection across independent systems rarely happens in response to economic pressure alone; it takes a structural rupture.
In October 2026, English was the content language of 49.5% of the websites whose content language W3Techs can identify, and Spanish, in second place, accounted for 6%. English’s share has fallen from its 2022 peak but has barely moved since early 2025.
The Mandarin ceiling
The surface economic case for Mandarin is real. China is the world’s largest economy by purchasing power parity, a position it has held since 2016 by IMF measures.
In 2023, China was the largest bilateral trading partner for 60 economies, almost twice as many as the United States. The Belt and Road Initiative has built Chinese financial relationships across Central Asia, Africa, and parts of Europe at a scale that superficially resembles British imperial commercial embedding.
The analogy breaks down on timing: English was embedded when global communication infrastructure was being built. Commercial legal codes, scientific journal systems, aviation standards and international financial institutions were all new and institutionally plastic when English got written into them.
Mandarin is entering a system with seventy to eighty years of English-language infrastructure already in place. A protocol embedded across independent systems cannot be replaced the way a product is replaced in a competitive market, by offering users a better alternative. Many of those systems would have to move at roughly the same time.
Scientific publishing shows how hard that is. In 2016, China surpassed the United States to become the world’s largest producer of scientific papers by volume. Yet Chinese-language scientific publication has not become a global standard. Chinese scientists publish their highest-impact work in English-language journals, because those journals carry the citation networks that determine career outcomes.
Enrollment in Chinese courses at US colleges peaked in 2013 and fell in both of the MLA’s following censuses: down 12.5% between 2013 and 2016, and another 14.3% between 2016 and 2021. Over the same period, Korean enrollment rose by roughly 57%, during the peak decade of discussion about China’s economic rise. Course counts cannot show what any one student weighed, and Korean drew on cultural pull as much as career plans. Still, for American students as a group, China’s economic scale did not make Mandarin look worth the cost of learning it.
The acquisition cost is real but secondary. Mandarin sits in Category IV, the hardest group on the US Foreign Service Institute’s scale, and takes about 88 weeks of training to reach professional working proficiency, against 30 weeks for French or Spanish. But a learner in Nairobi choosing between English and Mandarin is choosing between the existing network and the network that would exist if enough other people made the same choice first, and that coordination problem is the bigger barrier.
A coordinated defection would have to run through every one of those systems. ICAO would have to amend aviation communication standards, a negotiation among its 193 current member states. The scientific journal ecosystem would have to restructure citation networks around Chinese-language publication. The IMF and World Bank would have to change working languages. Multinational corporations across dozens of industries would have to rewrite internal language policies. No single economic fact, even China surpassing the United States in nominal GDP, would trigger them all at once.
Latin’s own displacement took three centuries and required structural changes from several independent directions: the Protestant Reformation, the vernacular printing press, the rise of national scientific academies, and the collapse of papal institutional authority across Europe. No single event caused it. The coordination equilibrium collapsed because multiple independent institutional systems shifted within a narrow enough window.
Economic power matters, as the case for Mandarin assumes. What that case underrates is how much of it is needed and what other conditions must be met simultaneously.
Belt and Road and Confucius Institutes: does the embedding mechanism replicate?
The British commercial embedding worked through legal infrastructure: the contracts were in English, the courts enforcing them came to run in English, and participation required the language. Does BRI replicate this? Chinese lenders and contractors have built roads, ports and power plants across BRI countries, but the legal plumbing has not moved into Mandarin. In a set of 100 Chinese loan contracts, China Eximbank’s contracts usually chose Chinese law and arbitration in China, but seven of eight China Development Bank contracts used English law. The Confucius Institute network in the United States, which numbered around 100 in 2019, has contracted sharply: by 2023, fewer than five institutes remained open. Where the network has expanded, it has built Mandarin instruction infrastructure. Under the EIC, though, schools were never what drove adoption of English: Macaulay noted that Indians were paying to learn English while the Company had to pay stipends to its Sanskrit and Arabic students. There is no sign yet that BRI has embedded Mandarin in contract law, technical standards bodies, or scientific publication infrastructure in recipient countries, so the British pattern is not repeating.
The structure we didn’t choose
The British Council has long estimated that more than 1.75 billion people speak English at a useful level, roughly one person in five on the planet today. For everyone among them who did not grow up with it, that has meant years of cognitive effort, educational expenditure, and opportunity cost to access a network they did not build and cannot opt out of without professional consequence.
Economically, this is a transfer. Grin’s 2005 estimate put the UK’s net gain from the dominance of English at €10 billion a year at minimum. Early in their careers, scientists from countries with low English proficiency spend about 91% more time reading a paper in English than native speakers do, and those from moderate-proficiency countries about 51% more time writing one. The cost is measurable in euros at the policy level and in working weeks at the desk.
Hiroshi Mikitani ran that arithmetic for one company in March 2010. The parent in Mumbai paying for English-medium school runs it for one child, and every time it comes out in favour of English, the network that tilted the answer grows a little larger.
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Further reading
As an Amazon Associate, Eikleaf earns from qualifying purchases. The book links below are affiliate links: if you buy through them, we may earn a small commission at no extra cost to you.
Babel: Around the World in Twenty LanguagesPlaces English beside nineteen other major languages, showing how history, institutions and power shape linguistic reach.
Empires of the Word: A Language History of the WorldCompares English’s expansion with earlier languages of commerce, administration, religion and empire.
The Adventure of English: The Biography of a LanguageFollows English through conquest, trade, colonisation and American expansion, supplying the narrative history behind the article’s economic explanation.
The Prodigal Tongue: The Love-Hate Relationship Between American and British EnglishExamines British and American linguistic prestige and challenges claims of inherent superiority, extending the article’s discussion of English and power.Recommended videos
7:24Why Did English Become the International Language?Langfocus on the historical forces, from empire to US power, that made English the global language.
3:07English in the world: A very brief history of a global languageThe Open University’s brief animated history of English’s spread around the world.
6:52How English Took Over the World | OtherwordsPBS Storied on how English took over and the network effects keeping it on top.Cite this article
Owen Parker. “The economic history of the English language: how a dialect became the world’s default.” Eikleaf, 10 May 2026, updated 2 November 2026. https://www.eikleaf.com/the-economic-history-of-the-english-language-how-a-dialect-became-the-worlds-default/
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Some contents of this page were generated and/or edited with the help of a Generative AI.
Media
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