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Last updated: · 14 min read

In brief
In 2000, classified ads brought American newspapers about $20 billion a year; by 2012, $4.6 billion. Their journalism had been paid for by a tollbooth: presses and trucks that rivals could not afford. When the internet made distribution free, much of the value moved to whoever controls attention. Content stopped being scarce. Google took about $265 billion in ad revenue in 2024, and feeds built for engagement amplify outrage. No regulation so far has changed what platforms are rewarded to do.

In 2000, classified advertising brought American newspapers roughly $20 billion a year. By 2012 it brought in $4.6 billion. The company that became the face of that collapse, Craigslist, had fewer than fifty employees.

Those few dozen people were leading the charge in a fifteen-billion-dollar collapse. Job boards, car sites and a recession did their share of the damage. Craigslist did its share without espionage, predatory pricing or regulatory capture, using a mostly free listings page that worked better than the one in the newspaper. It did what markets are supposed to do and offered a better product at a lower price, for most listings no price at all.

The received version of this story is about journalism. Newspapers died, the internet killed them, and now we’re all worse off. That version is mostly wrong in its diagnosis, though its conclusions hold. People never stopped wanting information. The industry collapsed because the economic structure that had sustained it for a century was built on a form of artificial scarcity that the internet made irrelevant. The value newspapers had captured went elsewhere, and following where it went, and why, explains what the attention economy is.

What newspapers were selling

Before the internet, a newspaper was, economically, a bundle. Classified ads (jobs, apartments, used cars) sat next to display advertising, local sports results, stock prices, weather forecasts and, somewhere in the middle of all that, journalism. Each component subsidized the others, but the money flowed in one direction. Classifieds were the engine: at their peak they brought in about 30 percent of total newspaper revenue, and that margin paid for reporters.

What held the bundle together was the cost of the infrastructure. Printing presses, delivery trucks, carrier networks, regional distribution agreements — building a newspaper required enormous capital investment. That capital investment was the barrier to entry, and the barrier to entry was the source of value. A classified advertiser in Dayton, Ohio, in 1995 had exactly one efficient way to reach people looking for a used Honda Civic in Dayton, Ohio: the Dayton Daily News. The Daily News did not need to be the best possible vehicle for that transaction, because it was the only one.

Economists call this rent. Newspapers were extracting it from their control of the distribution channel rather than from the quality of their product. The reporting, the investigative journalism and the local political coverage that held county commissioners accountable were all cross-subsidized by the rent that flowed from classifieds and display ads. The journalism was real, and a tollbooth paid for it.

The internet eliminated the tollbooth: when distribution costs went to zero, the capital barrier that had been generating newspaper rent evaporated. Craigslist could offer a better classified marketplace, searchable and mostly free, without owning a single printing press. By one estimate, Craigslist’s entry into local markets between 2000 and 2007 saved classified advertisers about $5 billion (in year-2000 dollars), money that, without Craigslist, would have gone to newspapers.

Television worked the same way, just with a different tollbooth. Broadcast networks controlled spectrum access, allocated by FCC licensing — scarcity imposed by regulation rather than capital cost. Cable multiplied the available channels; the internet finished the job. The business model was the same as the newspaper’s, selling access to a captive audience, and the internet took the captive part away.

The political cost of a cross-subsidy collapse

The classified revenue that vanished didn't fund everything equally. It funded, above all, the journalism that generated the least direct revenue: local political reporting. When Craigslist entered a local market, political editors took a disproportionate share of the cuts, while the sports and entertainment desks were largely spared. At papers that depended most on classifieds, Craigslist's arrival cut coverage of local congressional races by about 12 percent, and voters in affected areas split their tickets less often, a measurable shift toward straight-party voting.

The arithmetic of free

Understanding where the value of controlled distribution went requires a piece of economic logic that Herbert Simon articulated in 1971, decades before anyone had heard of Google: “A wealth of information creates a poverty of attention.” When information is abundant and free, the scarce resource becomes the attention required to process it.

Simon was writing about organizational design, not the internet. But the principle is a general one, and the internet made it operational for billions of people. When every newspaper, every broadcaster, every individual with a blog or a camera phone can distribute content at zero marginal cost, content stops being scarce. Attention, the fixed quantity of human consciousness available to process all that content, becomes the bottleneck. And whoever controls where that attention goes captures the economic value that used to attach to the content itself.

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Google’s business model shows this logic most plainly. Search is free, and what Google sells is you, or more precisely the organized delivery of your attention to an advertiser at the exact moment you’re expressing commercial intent. When you type “best running shoes” into Google, the customer is the advertiser, who pays for access to your attention at a moment of peak receptivity. That intent signal is valuable, and Google holds it at a scale no one else can match.

Facebook applies the same model to a different kind of attention. Google captures the intent-driven attention of people looking for something. Facebook captures the ambient attention of people socializing, scrolling and killing time.

In 2024 Google alone took in about $265 billion in advertising revenue worldwide. American newspapers’ advertising revenue, at its 2005 peak, was roughly $49 billion. By 2020, newspaper advertising revenue had fallen to about $9.6 billion, less than a fifth of that peak. Much of the money moved upstream, to the companies that organized the attention newspapers had once captured by default; some of it simply stayed with advertisers, who now paid less.

The specific wreckage

By 2025 the relocation had left a large hole in American local news. Nearly 3,500 American newspapers have closed since 2005, close to 40 percent of all local papers, and some fifty million Americans live in “news deserts,” places with limited or no access to local news. Two hundred twelve counties have no local news outlet of any kind. Another 1,525 have exactly one.

Then there is the Youngstown Vindicator, a paper built on investigative accountability over a hundred and fifty years of continuous publication, with coverage of the KKK, the mafia and local political corruption. It closed on August 31, 2019, and a hundred and forty-four employees lost their jobs. The name survives only as an edition of the Tribune Chronicle from neighboring Warren — a masthead, not a newsroom.

The New York Times, meanwhile, ended June 2026 with 13.35 million subscribers, 12.8 million of them digital-only. A handful of other national titles built subscription businesses in the millions, the Wall Street Journal among them, with 4.8 million subscriptions by mid-2026.

The survival of elite national outlets fits the argument. The Times escaped the cross-subsidy trap without becoming a platform or trying to out-sell Google and Meta to advertisers. It built direct reader revenue at a global scale that geography makes impossible for local papers. Subscriptions brought in about 70 percent of the Times’s $2.6 billion revenue in 2024; advertising is still there, at about a fifth. At that scale the exit works only for journalism that readers far from home will pay for. Readers in London, Seoul and São Paulo pay for Times coverage of the White House and the Middle East; Mahoning County, Ohio, cannot build a subscriber base in Mumbai. A handful of big metro papers have built paying digital audiences of around 100,000, the Minnesota Star Tribune among them, and they still lean on print and advertising too. The Vindicator had neither a global readership nor a big-city market, most local papers have neither, and the mechanism that killed it is intact.

The nonprofit alternative and its limits

ProPublica, The Texas Tribune, and a growing network of local nonprofit news organizations are a response to local journalism's collapse, but they cannot replicate its scale. The nonprofit news sector collectively employs several thousand journalists; newspaper newsrooms alone lost about 40,000 jobs between 2008 and 2020, more than half their staff. Philanthropy fills an important niche without restructuring a market. Nonprofit journalism is valuable, but donor-funded reporting cannot replace an economic model that once sustained thousands of newsrooms through self-sustaining revenue.

What the algorithm optimizes

The same economic logic that relocated value from content producers to attention aggregators also determines what those aggregators do with the attention they’ve captured.

When a platform’s revenue depends on how much time users spend on it, the platform optimizes to maximize that time. Engagement (likes, shares, comments, continued scrolling) is the proxy metric. The algorithm is always working out what keeps this person on the platform for another thirty seconds, and the platforms’ own researchers documented the answer: content that provokes strong emotional reactions, such as outrage, fear and moral disgust. These generate the most reliable engagement signals. They get shared more and produce comment threads that pull other users in.

Nobody at Facebook needed to want people angry. The company built a system designed to maximize engagement, and that system amplified divisive content, because divisive content reliably generates engagement. Internal documents that Frances Haugen disclosed in 2021 showed that Facebook’s own teams had documented the dynamic and proposed fixes, and that senior leadership overruled them.

William Brady, Molly Crockett and colleagues showed the mechanism from the user side. Tracking Twitter users and running experiments, they found that users who received more likes and retweets when expressing moral outrage were more likely to express outrage in subsequent posts; the platform’s reward structure was doing the teaching.

The problem extends beyond one company. Any platform whose revenue depends on maximizing attention time through a free product, whatever its management or country of origin, faces the same incentives to find what holds attention and optimize for it.

What Facebook knew, and when

In the autumn of 2021, The Wall Street Journal's "Facebook Files" investigation drew on internal documents showing that Facebook's researchers had repeatedly flagged the outrage-amplification problem. A 2018 change to the News Feed algorithm, designed to prioritize "meaningful social interactions," had the predictable effect of amplifying emotionally provocative content, because that's what generates interactions. Internal presentations warned senior leadership. Proposals to weight the algorithm toward less inflammatory content were rejected on the grounds that they would reduce engagement. Haugen's Senate testimony that October put those documents into the public record. Three weeks later, with the leaked documents still making headlines, the company renamed itself Meta — a rebrand critics read as a change of subject.

Why markets do this

Google has held roughly 90 percent of the global search market for over a decade, despite plenty of competition. Microsoft has spent billions on Bing, and every few years a new search startup arrives with venture funding and a pitch about doing search differently. None of them have made a dent. Facebook has weathered the Cambridge Analytica scandal, congressional hearings, advertiser boycotts, a whistleblower and a rebrand. Meta’s advertising revenue dipped in 2022, then recovered, reaching $160.6 billion in 2024.

American courts have ruled that Google broke antitrust law to protect its monopolies in search and in advertising technology, so conduct is part of the story. Much of what keeps competitors out, though, is built into how these markets work.

Network effects come first. The value of a platform to any individual user increases with the number of other users. More users produce more content, which improves recommendations, which attracts more advertisers, which funds better infrastructure, which attracts more users. Markets for information goods tend toward tipping because of positive feedback loops like this one. Once a platform reaches critical mass, the gap between it and competitors becomes self-reinforcing. And the economics of digital goods compound it: serving one additional user of Google Search costs Google very little. A newspaper that doubled its circulation doubled its printing and distribution costs. A platform that doubles its user base needs more servers and bandwidth, a far smaller bill. Once fixed infrastructure costs are covered, much of each additional dollar is profit, which funds the algorithmic improvements that widen the gap further.

You cannot compete with Google or Facebook on price, because both are free. Two-sided markets turn that free price into a barrier. A platform serves two distinct customer groups, users and advertisers, and connects them. Users get a free product funded by advertising. Advertisers get access to a user base they can’t efficiently reach elsewhere. A would-be mass-market competitor has to offer its product for free too, which means it also needs advertising revenue, which means it needs a user base large enough to attract advertisers, which means it’s caught in the same chicken-and-egg loop the incumbents already solved a decade ago. Competition happens on recommendation quality and engagement features, where the incumbent with more data has an advantage that grows with every user added.

By industry estimates, Google and Meta’s combined share of US digital advertising revenue peaked at 54.7 percent in 2017 and slipped below half in 2022. That decline doesn’t mean the market is becoming less concentrated, because the same logic is replicating elsewhere. Amazon built an advertising business that took in $68.6 billion in 2025 by capturing product-search intent, the same mechanism Google uses for web search, applied to shopping. TikTok captured entertainment attention using the same engagement-optimization playbook.

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The limits of what regulation can do

If the concentration is structural and the incentives are determined by the business model, then the way to judge regulation is by what it has done so far, and the record is not encouraging.

The Australian News Media Bargaining Code, which became law in March 2021, was the most ambitious attempt to redistribute value from platforms to publishers. For a while it worked. More than thirty commercial agreements were struck between Australian news organizations and platforms. Newsrooms hired journalists with the resulting funds. When the Treasury reviewed the Code in December 2022, as the law required, it called it a success.

Then, in February 2024, Meta announced it would not renew any of its deals with Australian media organizations and would shut down Facebook News, its dedicated news tab, in Australia. The expiring deals were estimated to be worth about A$70 million a year to Australian news organizations. Up to then, no digital platform corporation had been designated under the Code’s enforcement mechanism. The Code’s enforcement power had never been used, and Meta had just walked away from the deals the Code was meant to encourage.

The Code moved some platform money to publishers for a few years. It did not change what platforms optimize for, who they sell attention to, or how their algorithms decide what content gets amplified.

Canberra’s answer came in August 2026, when Parliament passed a News Bargaining Incentive: large social-media and search platforms now face a charge unless they strike deals with news businesses, and the money flows back to newsrooms either way. It closes the loophole Meta walked through, but it is still a way of moving money.

The US Journalism Competition and Preservation Act would have allowed news publishers to collectively negotiate with platforms — an antitrust exemption for collective bargaining. It cleared the Senate Judiciary Committee twice, in 2022 and 2023, but never reached a floor vote.

The EU Digital Services Act, binding on the largest platforms since August 2023 and on all platforms since February 2024, aims higher. It requires Very Large Online Platforms to conduct annual systemic risk assessments, including how their recommender systems contribute to disinformation amplification. It mandates mitigation measures. But the platforms write the assessments themselves, audited by firms they pay, and enforcement has moved slowly. The first fine, €120 million against X in December 2025, punished deceptive blue checkmarks, opaque ad data and barriers to researchers, not the feed. In 2024, under Commission investigation, TikTok permanently withdrew a rewards programme on its Lite app in the EU that rewarded users for tasks such as watching videos. Only in 2026 did the Commission take aim at the main feeds themselves, issuing preliminary findings in February that TikTok’s infinite scroll, autoplay and personalized recommendations breach the law, and in July the same against Facebook and Instagram. Until final decisions land, those feeds run on the same incentive to maximize engagement.

Changing the incentives would mean changing the business model, and three models are conceivable. The first is subscription at platform scale. If users paid directly for search and social media, platforms wouldn’t need to maximize advertiser access to attention time. But platform subscriptions so far, from X Premium and Meta Verified to the ad-free tier Meta has offered European users since late 2023, sit alongside the advertising model rather than replacing it. No platform has voluntarily given up its primary revenue source.

The second is to regulate the algorithm itself, requiring platforms to adopt recommendation systems that don’t optimize for engagement time. This is possible in principle, and the EU’s 2026 cases against TikTok’s and Meta’s feed design are the first real tests. In practice it is very hard to define in law: too vague and it’s unenforceable, too specific and it can’t adapt. It is also likely to push users toward less-regulated alternatives.

The third is structural separation: platforms would have to be either content recommenders or advertising businesses, not both. Break the link between what gets amplified and what generates advertising revenue. It would go furthest of the three, and it is the hardest to imagine any legislature passing.

The public subsidy alternative

There is another approach, which routes around the platform economy instead of trying to fix it: direct public funding for journalism, on the BBC model or as government support for local news. Unlike regulating platforms, it accepts the attention economy as a given and tries to sustain journalism outside it. But in the American context, the obstacles are severe: political capture risk is real (which party decides who gets funded?), the scale gap between what philanthropy and subsidy can provide and what the market once sustained is enormous, and the coalitions lobbying for public money have so far won modest state programmes, such as New York's $90 million, three-year tax credit for newsroom jobs.

Current regulatory approaches have not reached the core problem. They redistribute some revenue, mandate some self-assessment or, in the American antitrust cases against Google, ban exclusive deals and open data and ad auctions to rivals, and the cases aimed at the feed itself are still unresolved. None of them changes what platforms are economically rewarded to do. And the difficulty isn’t only a failure of political will. The business model that produces outrage amplification and news-desert creation is the same business model that underpins the cheapest information distribution system ever built. Dismantling the incentive structure means paying more for distribution, or accepting less of it.

No large political constituency is organized around that trade-off. And it isn’t clear one could be, because organizing a political constituency now requires competing for attention on the very platforms whose incentive structure you’re trying to change. The reform campaigns optimize for engagement, and the members of Congress who hold hearings on algorithmic amplification announce those hearings on X.

Forty-some employees at a mostly free listings site led the charge that erased a century-old subsidy, and the value moved from those who produced content to those who decide what gets read.

What remains open is whether the institutions built to govern this economy can do so from inside a system that has already captured the resource they’d need to organize the effort: the public’s attention.

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Cite this article
Ingrid Dahl. “How the internet changed the economics of attention — and everything else.” Eikleaf, 10 May 2026, updated 2 November 2026. https://www.eikleaf.com/how-the-internet-changed-the-economics-of-attention-and-everything-else/

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