Last updated: · 14 min read
In brief
Between Egypt and Sudan lies Bir Tawil, 2,060 square kilometres of desert that no country on Earth claims. Japan, meanwhile, has spent hundreds of millions encasing two Pacific rocks in steel and concrete to keep them above the tide. The difference is water. If Okinotorishima counts as an island, Japan gains rights to the fish and seabed of about 400,000 square kilometres of ocean. Bir Tawil has no coastline. Yet if those rocks vanish under rising seas, nobody has settled whether Japan keeps the ocean.
Contents
Between Egypt and Sudan there is a trapezoid of desert, 2,060 square kilometres, that no country on Earth claims. It is called Bir Tawil. It has no permanent inhabitants, no infrastructure and no coastline — nothing a government has ever thought worth claiming. Ababda and Bishari pastoralists pass through. Unregulated gold miners have set up camps. In 2014, a Virginia man named Jeremiah Heaton planted a flag in the sand so his young daughter, Emily, could call herself a real princess. No government recognised the claim.
Seventeen hundred kilometres south of Tokyo, two rocks barely protrude from the Pacific. At high tide the larger clears the waterline by centimetres. Japan has encased both in steel breakwaters and concrete, and draped the smaller one in titanium netting.
Japan has also built a three-storey observation platform on stilts in the lagoon, fitted with radar to watch passing ships, and work crews now arrive by convoy to build a harbour that is not due to be finished until the 2030s. By 2016 Japan had already spent about $600 million keeping two specks of coral above the waterline; the harbour project alone is now budgeted at 222 billion yen in total.
Bir Tawil’s neighbours will not take its desert for free, yet another country spends a fortune on two rocks the ocean is steadily grinding away. One is landlocked; the other sits in the ocean, and a speck of land in the ocean can lay claim to the water around it.
The territory nobody wants
Bir Tawil exists because of two lines drawn three years apart. In 1899, Britain drew the political boundary between Egypt and its Anglo-Egyptian condominium in Sudan along the 22nd parallel, a clean line through empty desert of the kind colonial powers favoured because it required no knowledge of local geography. In 1902, a separate administrative boundary was drawn to reflect the reality that certain tribes north of the 22nd parallel had stronger ties to Khartoum than to Cairo, and that the Ababda people south of it oriented toward Egypt. The administrative line deviated from the political line in two places. It placed the Halaib Triangle, roughly 20,580 square kilometres of Red Sea coastline with the port town of Halaib and a settled population, under Sudanese authority. It placed Bir Tawil, a sliver of inland desert, under Egyptian authority.
When Sudan gained independence in 1956, both countries reached for the boundary that gave them Halaib. Egypt asserts the 1899 political line: Halaib is Egyptian, Bir Tawil is Sudanese. Sudan asserts the 1902 administrative line: Halaib is Sudanese, Bir Tawil is Egyptian. Since the mid-1990s, Egypt has held Halaib with military force and administered it as part of the Red Sea Governorate. Sudan protests but lacks the leverage to reverse the occupation.
Neither country claims Bir Tawil, because claiming it means conceding the boundary that yields Halaib. The Halaib Triangle has a Red Sea coastline, a population, a port, manganese deposits and potential offshore resources in waters that remain largely unexplored. Bir Tawil has none of these.
The result is unique in modern geopolitics: a habitable territory that both neighbours have abandoned to a sovereignty vacuum. The handful of individuals who have “claimed” it are legally irrelevant. International law provides no mechanism for a private citizen to acquire sovereignty over terra nullius. Heaton’s flag, planted as a birthday present for his daughter and turned into a viral news story soon afterwards, has no legal effect.
Bir Tawil’s real handicap is that it has no coastline, and in the twenty-first century a coastline is what makes empty territory worth claiming.
How water became more valuable than land
The mechanism is UNCLOS, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted in 1982. Under its provisions, any state with a coastline is entitled to a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone: sovereign rights over every living and non-living resource in the water column and on the seabed. A single small island, if it qualifies, generates an EEZ of approximately 430,000 square kilometres — an area larger than Germany and Belgium combined, projected from a feature that might be smaller than a football pitch.
An EEZ grants exclusive rights to the fish, to seabed minerals and to any energy resources in the water or beneath it. For a country built on specks of coral, the ocean can be worth more than everything on land: in Kiribati, fishing revenue has supplied between 60 and 82 per cent of all government revenue in every year from 2015 to 2022.
But Article 121, paragraph 3, draws a line. “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” Rocks get only a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, plus a contiguous zone for customs and policing beyond it — a fraction of the prize.
UNCLOS never defines “human habitation” or “economic life of their own”. Its drafters left both deliberately vague as a diplomatic compromise. States exploit the vagueness by insisting their rocks are islands, and unless a neighbour takes them to court or arbitration, nobody overrules them.
The most ambitious attempt to draw the line came in 2016. The Philippines brought a case against China before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, challenging Chinese claims in the South China Sea, and in July the tribunal issued its award. The tribunal found that none of the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands qualified as an island capable of generating an EEZ, not even Itu Aba, the largest, which has fresh water, vegetation and a Taiwanese garrison. The reasoning was strict. What counted was a feature’s capacity, in its natural condition, to sustain a stable community of people — and the best evidence of that capacity was history, not theory. Habitation that depended on imported food and externally supplied personnel didn’t count. Economic activity had to be generated by the feature itself, not by state investment in infrastructure.
China rejected the ruling, and no enforcement mechanism compels it to comply. Every state with a marginal rock-versus-island claim took note anyway, because the tribunal’s logic, applied globally, would strip many such features of their maritime zones.
The 2016 tribunal's reasoning on Article 121(3)
The South China Sea arbitration ruled on the Spratlys, but its framework reaches marginal claims everywhere. Island status turns on what a feature could sustain in its natural condition, which no infrastructure can manufacture, and a feature that has never sustained a community of its own is presumed to lack it, unless war or some other outside force drove people away. A purely official population, supplied from outside, does not establish "human habitation" within the meaning of Article 121. Economic activity must belong to the feature itself, through fisheries worked by residents or agriculture sustained by its own soil, and not to state-funded construction or to boats that come only to extract its resources. Japan's Okinotorishima has never sustained independent habitation. Its "economic activity" is state-funded research and fishing by visiting boats. Under the tribunal's logic, it would very likely be a rock. Japan has never submitted the question to adjudication.
The concrete islands
Japan shows how far a state will go to stay on the right side of Article 121. Okinotorishima, two features called Higashikojima and Kitakojima, sits in the Philippine Sea 1,740 kilometres south of Tokyo and is Japan’s southernmost territory.
Japan’s programme of fortification began in 1987, when the reef was designated a coastal conservation area and the first steel breakwaters went up in a national government construction programme; in 1999 the national government took over direct coastal maintenance and management, and over the years the works grew to include concrete encasements, titanium wave-dispersal netting and eventually a platform on stilts. The structures are not designed for human use; they exist so that the features stay above water at high tide, as they must to qualify as land under UNCLOS. If Okinotorishima qualifies as an island under Article 121, Japan gains an EEZ of approximately 400,000 square kilometres, larger than all of Japan’s land. Japan presents the radar-equipped observation post, the harbour under construction and the periodic research and fishing expeditions as a base for seabed-resource surveys, fisheries and science; they also let it argue that these features can sustain economic life of their own. Nobody lives there; the visitors come because the law rewards a visible presence.
China, South Korea, and Taiwan dispute the claim. Their argument is pointed: Okinotorishima is a rock within the meaning of Article 121(3), and no amount of concrete poured around it can turn it into an island. China told the UN in 2009 that the “so-called Oki-no-Tori Shima Island is in fact a rock”. Japan’s position is that the concrete preserves a natural feature rather than creating one. That distinction separates a 400,000-square-kilometre EEZ from a 12-nautical-mile circle of territorial sea, and it has never been tested in court. No state with a similarly fortified claim wants to establish the precedent.
Twelve thousand kilometres east, across the Pacific, France has taken the opposite approach to an equally remote claim.
Clipperton Island is a French atoll of 8.9 square kilometres, sitting 1,280 kilometres southwest of Acapulco and closer to Mexico than to any French territory. France won sovereignty through international arbitration in 1931 after a dispute with Mexico dating to the nineteenth century. The atoll generates an EEZ of approximately 435,000 square kilometres — four-fifths the size of metropolitan France. France maintains no permanent presence. Nobody lives there, and French Navy patrols are rare.
A fisheries scientist reviewing the evidence in 2009 described French naval surveillance as “scattered to non-existent” and judged that much of the fishing in Clipperton’s waters was probably done without a licence. The catch taken from the EEZ ran to an estimated 50,000 tonnes a year, with signs of lobster diving and shark finning close to the atoll. The wider Eastern Pacific carries other traffic too, though far beyond France’s waters: in 2024 French authorities seized a cocaine semi-submersible some 1,250 miles south of the atoll. Had all that fish been paid for at the rate Korean boats pay in French Polynesia, France would have collected roughly €21 million a year in access fees. It was receiving about €1.2 million, from licensed Korean vessels.
Japan spends hundreds of millions keeping up a presence on rocks no one could inhabit, while France claims an ocean it cannot police around an island it barely visits. The law of the sea lets both stand, because it rewards legal entitlement whether or not a state can back it with physical presence.
The occupation game
Okinotorishima and Clipperton are extreme cases of a common practice. Dozens of states maintain token presences on uninhabited islands for the same reasons, differing only in scale.
The legal foundation predates UNCLOS by half a century. The doctrine of effective occupation, rooted in colonial-era international law and articulated most clearly by Max Huber in the 1928 Island of Palmas arbitration, rests title on the continuous and peaceful display of state authority over a territory. How much display is enough depends on the place: Huber accepted that on remote, uninhabited land it could be intermittent, and the 1931 Clipperton award held that France had not lost the atoll merely by failing to exercise authority there. Where a rival contests a claim, though, visible acts of authority are what a state can put in evidence.
For uninhabited islands, this translates into sovereignty theatre. States set up weather stations, rotate military or scientific crews, issue postage stamps for territories with no postal service, keep unmanned lighthouses and apply administrative designations to rock and water. Each act is small; together they give a state a record of authority to set before any rival or tribunal that questions its title.
Australia’s Heard and McDonald Islands sit roughly 4,000 kilometres southwest of Perth: uninhabited volcanic islands in the sub-Antarctic, reachable only by a multi-day sea voyage through some of the roughest water on Earth. They generate an EEZ of roughly 417,000 square kilometres. Nobody lives there; Australia sends occasional scientific expeditions, the 2025–26 voyages the first in more than 20 years, and runs a tightly controlled commercial fishery: longliners for Patagonian toothfish and trawlers for mackerel icefish, with no more than three trawlers at a time in the whole fishery and every vessel carrying an Australian Fisheries Management Authority observer and a satellite tracker. The catch goes to Australia, Japan, the United States, China and eastern Europe, and the fishery is so small that its value is a commercial secret. Administration and occasional presence keep the sovereignty claim alive, the claim carries the EEZ, and the EEZ carries the right to the fish.
The United States tried the most literal form of presence. Baker, Howland and Jarvis islands, all uninhabited, sit in the central Pacific. In 1935, the US Department of Commerce settled young Hawaiian men on all three specifically to establish sovereignty claims against Japanese expansion. The operation was conducted in secrecy. Over the programme’s seven years more than 130 men served as colonists, most of them young Native Hawaiians recruited from Kamehameha Schools and other Honolulu schools. They lived in extreme isolation on barren atolls, rotating in small groups, typically of four, for months at a time, monitoring weather and maintaining a visible American presence on islands that Washington also wanted for future air routes between California and Australia. On 8 December 1941, Japanese bombers struck Howland, killing colonists Joseph Keliʻihananui and Richard Whaley. The survivors from all three islands were evacuated in early 1942.
The US never resettled them. Instead, it held them by administrative designation: the nineteenth-century Guano Islands Act claims, national wildlife refuges, and finally a marine national monument created in 2009 and expanded in 2014 (renamed the Pacific Islands Heritage Marine National Monument in January 2025). The Howland-Baker EEZ alone covers about 435,000 square kilometres, close to four per cent of the entire US EEZ.
Rockall, a granite stump roughly 300 kilometres west of Scotland’s St Kilda archipelago, jutting 17 metres above the North Atlantic, shows what happens when a state concedes the point. In 1955, a Royal Navy landing party from HMS Vidal, put ashore by helicopter, raised the Union Flag and cemented a plaque to the rock. Parliament incorporated it into the county of Inverness via the Island of Rockall Act 1972. But when the UK ratified UNCLOS in 1997, it conceded that Rockall is a rock under Article 121(3) and cannot generate an EEZ, then redrew its fisheries limits to be measured from St Kilda instead. The concession did not settle the matter. The UK, Ireland, Denmark via the Faroe Islands, and Iceland still dispute the surrounding continental shelf. The UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf can assess where a shelf ends, but it will not examine a disputed area without the consent of every state involved; dividing the seabed between them takes agreement or adjudication.
What EEZ rights are worth in cold cash
The clearest illustration of the economic stakes comes from small nations selling access to their own waters. The eight Pacific states of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement collectively control the world's largest skipjack tuna fishery through their combined EEZs. Their Vessel Day Scheme sells foreign fleets the right to fish by the day, at a benchmark price that reached US$6,000 per vessel-day in 2014. Revenue to PNA nations quadrupled in three years, from about US$60 million in 2010 to roughly US$250 million in 2013, and has kept rising since. The purse-seine tuna catch across the wider Western and Central Pacific, three-quarters of it skipjack, was worth an estimated US$3.9 billion in 2013 alone.
When the rocks go under
The maritime claims described above rest on an assumption UNCLOS never questioned: that the rocks and atolls generating them will continue to exist. Some may not.
UNCLOS was drafted in 1982, and its framework for measuring maritime zones, with baselines set by the low-water line along the coast, assumes a stable sea level. The sea is now rising.
On the traditional reading, a feature that submerges ceases to be land under the Convention, and land that no longer exists generates no maritime zone. Claims built on rocks and atolls and slivers of coral barely above the tide line would then shrink or vanish with them.
For Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Marshall Islands, low-lying Pacific atoll nations, the answer bears on their public finances and perhaps their statehood. Their EEZs, generated by atolls barely above sea level, earn them a large share of government revenue through fishing licences: most of it in Kiribati, and around half in Tuvalu in good years. Kiribati’s landmass averages less than two metres above sea level, and Tuvalu’s highest natural point is 4.6 metres. Rising water threatens to make them uninhabitable, and until recently the assumption was that the EEZs would go with the land, taking the fishing revenue, the seabed rights and the basis for statehood itself.
The law has begun to respond, though only in part. In May 2024, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea issued an advisory opinion requested by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law. But ITLOS addressed environmental obligations under UNCLOS, not the question of maritime baselines. The harder question reached the International Court of Justice, which delivered its advisory opinion on the obligations of states in respect of climate change in July 2025. The Court held that states are not obliged under UNCLOS to update their charts or lists of geographical coordinates showing the baselines and outer limits of their maritime zones once those have been duly established in conformity with the Convention. It added that, once a state is established, the disappearance of one of its constituent elements would not necessarily entail the loss of its statehood. In May 2026 the UN General Assembly formally endorsed the opinion, adding political weight to the freeze.
In practice, baselines duly drawn when features were above water need not be redrawn as those features erode. The opinion’s hedged language leaves significant gaps, but its direction is clear: a state can draw its lines now and keep them, at least until someone with standing challenges them.
But the opinion is advisory and binds no one. Its freeze also protects only zones that were “duly established in conformity with the Convention” in the first place, and China, South Korea and Taiwan deny that Okinotorishima’s zone ever was. If Okinotorishima’s two rocks disappear despite the concrete, does Japan keep its 400,000 square kilometres of ocean? Neither the ICJ nor anyone else has answered that. Japan’s expenditure is a bet that the question never gets asked — or that by the time it does, the legal freezing of baselines will have hardened into customary international law, and the physical reality under the water will have become irrelevant.
Bir Tawil will be there long after the concrete crumbles. It sits on bedrock, hundreds of metres above sea level, out of reach of the tides that threaten the coral atolls and the concrete-encased rocks in the Philippine Sea.
For as long as Egypt and Sudan hold to their rival lines, it will also stay unclaimed. In the architecture that now governs the world’s oceans, sovereignty over uninhabited land is valued by the projection the land makes into the sea, and Bir Tawil, the most permanent territory on this list, projects nothing.
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Further reading
As an Amazon Associate, Eikleaf earns from qualifying purchases. The book links below are affiliate links: if you buy through them, we may earn a small commission at no extra cost to you.
How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United StatesExplains the Guano Islands Act, American island possessions and the strategic reasons for claiming remote Pacific territory.
Pocket Atlas of Remote Islands: Fifty Islands I Have Not Visited and Never WillPairs maps with short historical narratives about remote islands, including Clipperton and territories occupied by scientists, military personnel or castaways.
The Power of Geography: Ten Maps That Reveal the Future of Our WorldExplains maritime rivalry around Australia and the contested waters between Greece and Turkey, placing claims to islands and offshore resources in a broader geopolitical setting.
The Outlaw Ocean: Journeys Across the Last Untamed FrontierReports on illegal fishing, offshore extraction and Sealand, showing how maritime claims can exceed a state’s ability to enforce them.Recommended videos
2:13Bir Tawil – the land that nobody wantsWitty two-minute explainer of why neither Egypt nor Sudan claims Bir Tawil.
4:45TWL #2: Bir Tawil- The Land Without a CountryShort explainer on the border quirk that left Bir Tawil unclaimed.
6:08Why Japan Spent $600 Million Protecting Two RocksWhy Japan spent hundreds of millions shoring up Okinotorishima: the exclusive economic zone the rocks secure.Cite this article
Owen Parker. “The last territories with no permanent population — and who is quietly claiming them.” Eikleaf, 17 May 2026, updated 2 November 2026. https://www.eikleaf.com/the-last-territories-with-no-permanent-population-and-who-is-quietly-claiming-them/
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Some contents of this page were generated and/or edited with the help of a Generative AI.
Media
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